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TWO-TIME PRESIDENTS AND  
THE VICE-PRESIDENCY 
DAN T. COENEN* 
Abstract: Does the Constitution limit the ability of a twice-before-elected 
President to serve as Vice-President? This question presents an intricate con-
stitutional puzzle, the solution of which requires working through four sepa-
rate sub-inquiries: Is a two-term President wholly ineligible for the vice-
presidency? Is such a person barred from election to the vice-presidency even 
if that person remains appointable to that office? Is a twice-before-elected 
President, even if properly placed in the vice-presidency, incapable of suc-
ceeding to the presidency? And if such a succession occurs, must the resulting 
term of service as President expire after two years? This Article addresses 
each of these questions by exploring the implications of the decisive constitu-
tional texts—Article II’s enumeration of presidential qualifications, the 
Twelfth Amendment’s treatment of qualifications for the vice-presidency, and 
the post-service limitations placed on two-term Presidents by the Twenty-
Second Amendment. Some analysts have argued that the Constitution fore-
closes the possibility that a twice-before-elected President can hold (or at least 
secure election to) the vice-presidential office. However, the text and history 
of the relevant constitutional provisions point to the opposite conclusion: A 
twice-before-elected President may become Vice-President, either through ap-
pointment or through election, and thereafter succeed from that office to the 
presidency for the full remainder of the pending term. 
INTRODUCTION 
Can a former two-term President seek and serve in the vice-presidency? 
Non-lawyers often assume that the answer is no, and prominent constitu-
tional scholars agree.1 The analysis of these experts begins with the Twelfth 
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 1 E.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK 204 n.34 (2006); AKHIL REED AM-
AR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION 436 n.8 (2005); Richard Albert, The Constitutional Politics of 
Presidential Succession, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 497, 565 (2011); Peter Baker, VP Bill? Depends on 
Meaning of ‘Elected,’ WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2006/10/19/AR2006101901572.html [http://perma.cc/TUT8-Y9ZV] (citing Eugene 
Volokh and Bruce Ackerman as expressing the view that former President Bill Clinton cannot run 
for Vice-President); Eugene Volokh, Bill Clinton for Vice-President?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
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Amendment, which provides that “no person constitutionally ineligible to 
the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the Unit-
ed States.”2 In addition, the Twenty-Second Amendment prohibits any 
twice-elected President from again securing election to that office.3 And 
because voters thus cannot put a twice-before-elected President back into 
the presidency, such a person is—these analysts conclude—“ineligible to 
the office of President” and therefore not “eligible to that of Vice-President” 
under the disqualifying terms of the Twelfth Amendment. 
This argument has a surface appeal. But it masks subtleties in the law. 
The most significant complication arises because the Twelfth Amendment 
makes access to the vice-presidency hinge on whether the would-be candi-
date for that position is “ineligible to the office of the President.”4 This 
choice of words matters because it interlocks the Twelfth Amendment not 
with the Twenty-Second Amendment, but with the preexisting terms of Ar-
ticle II, Section 1, Clause 5, which specifically address whether a person is 
“eligible to the Office of the President.”5 What is more, the Article II clause 
imposes no term limit of any sort on presidential service. Instead, it requires 
only that a President be (1) a natural-born citizen, (2) at least thirty-five 
years of age, and (3) a resident of the United States for at least fourteen 
years.6 Because twice-before-elected Presidents (such as George W. Bush or 
Bill Clinton) continue to meet each of these three (and only three) textually-
specified eligibility requirements, such persons are—according to propo-
nents of the they-can-run position—not “ineligible” to be President for pur-
poses of the Twelfth Amendment. Therefore, they remain “eligible” to seek 
and to hold the vice-presidency.7 
To be sure, the first sentence of the Twenty-Second Amendment speci-
fies that “[n]o person shall be elected to the office of the President more 
than twice.”8 But that clause, so the argument goes, does not address who is 
“ineligible” for the presidency; rather, it addresses only how many times an 
eligible person can be “elected” to that office. Therefore, so the argument 
continues, the Twenty-Second Amendment casts no light on who is “eligi-
                                                                                                                           
(June 19, 2006, 1:30 PM), http://www.volokh.com/posts/1150738214.shtml [http://perma.cc/YL5F-
BPVM]; see also Derek T. Muller, Scrutinizing Federal Electoral Qualifications, 90 IND. L.J. 559, 
570 (2015) (concluding that “[t]he stronger view may be that once a President has met the term 
limits of the 22nd Amendment, he is ineligible”). 
 2 U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 3 Id. at amend. XXII. 
 4 Id. at amend. XII (emphasis added). 
 5 Id. at art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (emphasis added). 
 6 Id. 
 7 See Bruce G. Peabody & Scott E. Gant, The Twice and Future President: Constitutional 
Interstices and the Twenty-Second Amendment, 83 MINN. L. REV. 565, 613–14 (1999). 
 8 U.S. CONST. amend. XXII. 
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ble” to be Vice-President under the Twelfth Amendment. And that is all the 
more the case because a person can become President either by way of elec-
tion or through other means.9 
In an article published in 1999, Bruce G. Peabody and Scott E. Gant 
navigated their way through this maze of clauses in advancing the claim 
that the Constitution permits election to the vice-presidency of a twice-
before-chosen President.10 The Peabody and Gant article does much useful 
work by mapping out the basic textual route to this conclusion. But its 
treatment of the subject leaves a great deal of the key legal ground uncov-
ered. To begin with, the article does not consider new arguments and anal-
yses that have cropped up in recent years, including pronouncements of-
fered by such well-credentialed observers as Judge Richard Posner and even 
former two-term President Bill Clinton.11 No less important, that treatment 
fails to distinguish carefully among four separate legal questions that are in 
the picture here—namely (1) whether a twice-before-elected President is 
wholly ineligible to become Vice-President; (2) whether a twice-before-
elected President is partly ineligible to be Vice-President in the sense that 
such a person may be appointed—but not elected—to that office; (3) 
whether a twice-before-elected President, if properly placed in the vice-
presidency, can thereafter succeed to the presidency; and (4) whether a 
twice-before-elected President who does succeed to the presidency from the 
vice-presidency faces any durational limit on the resulting term of presiden-
tial service.12 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See infra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 10 Peabody & Gant, supra note 7, at 633; see also Michael C. Dorf, The Case for a Gore-
Clinton Ticket, FINDLAW (July 31, 2000), http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/dorf/20000731.html [http://
perma.cc/27KM-N4FM] (advancing the same text-driven conclusion). Notably, the terms “twice-
before-chosen President” and “twice-before-elected President” do not cover the full range of Pres-
idents covered by the Twenty-Second Amendment. See infra note 33 and accompanying text. 
Apart from persons who have been twice-elected to the presidency, the Amendment renders ineli-
gible for that office persons who have been elected President once and also have served as Presi-
dent for more than two years of another term. See infra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 11 See supra note 1 and accompanying text (noting works on this topic authored by Professors 
Volokh and Akhil Reed Amar); infra notes 120, 167–168 and accompanying text (addressing the 
opinions of Bill Clinton and Judge Posner on the constitutionality of a twice-before-elected Presi-
dent serving as Vice-President). For purposes of simplicity and convenience, this Article does not 
specifically reference such exceptional cases every time it discusses the basic operation of the 
Twenty-Second Amendment. Instead, it focuses attention on “twice-before-elected” Presidents 
and therefore typically uses such terms. 
 12 This is not to say that Peabody and Gant fail to disaggregate all these issues, particularly 
the first two. See Peabody & Gant, supra note 7. But they do not fully develop the difference be-
tween those two issues, give only passing attention to the third issue, and do not identify the fourth 
issue at all. No less important, the Peabody and Gant article does not consider the final sentence of 
Section 1 of the Twenty-Second Amendment, which deals with transitioning from a rule of poten-
tially unlimited presidential service to the present-day regime in which the Twenty-Second 
Amendment operates with full force. This omission is striking because the transition clause envel-
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This Article addresses each of these questions. Part I considers and re-
jects the argument that a twice-before-elected President is wholly ineligible to 
become Vice-President,13 and Part II rebuts the alternative claim that such a 
President could be appointed, but not elected, to the vice-presidency.14 Part 
III directs attention to whether a twice-before-chosen President can move 
from the vice-presidency into the presidency and, if so, for how long such a 
successor President can serve.15 In particular, it explains why Vice-
Presidents who previously have held the presidency face no special limita-
tions along these lines, but instead enjoy the same rights of succession held 
by all other Vice-Presidents. 
Part IV turns attention to the special problems raised by negative-
implication arguments founded on the Twenty-Second Amendment’s little-
noticed transition clause.16 Of particular importance, Professor Amar has 
suggested that the transition clause supports the conclusion that the Twelfth 
and Twenty-Second Amendments interact to bar twice-elected Presidents 
from securing election to the vice-presidency.17 Part IV challenges this view 
by suggesting that the transition clause is best seen as dealing with only the 
transition period itself and not as creating any broad implications with re-
spect to the post-transition period.18 
Some observers might dismiss these matters as unworthy of attention. 
Why waste the ink on this paper, they might ask, when it is certain that no 
twice-before-elected President will ever seek the vice-presidency?19 
In fact, there are many reasons why these questions merit careful scru-
tiny. To begin with, it is wrong to claim that a twice-elected President will 
never seek to become Vice-President. Indeed, the chance that such a run for 
                                                                                                                           
ops all four issues raised by the prospect of a vice-presidential run by a twice-before-elected Pres-
ident. As a result, any complete discussion of this subject must give that clause the sort of close 
attention it receives in this Article. 
 13 See infra notes 31–150 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 151–176 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 177–210 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 211–223 and accompanying text. 
 17 See U.S. CONST. amend. XII; id. at amend. XXII; AMAR, supra note 1, at 436 n.8. 
 18 See infra notes 211–223 and accompanying text. 
 19 Of present day significance in this regard, the often-discussed idea of having Bill Clinton 
appear on the same ticket as Hillary Rodham Clinton faces a distinctive problem that exists wholly 
apart from the matters considered in this Article. This is the case because the Twelfth Amendment 
bars Electoral College members from casting votes for two candidates from their own state. This 
limitation would place presidential electors from New York in a major bind unless, for example, 
Bill Clinton reestablished residency in Arkansas, perhaps significantly in advance of the election. 
See Sanford Levinson & Ernest A. Young, Who’s Afraid of the Twelfth Amendment?, 29 FLA. ST. 
L. REV. 925, 932–36 (2001) (discussing potential unconstitutionality of the casting of votes by 
Texas Electoral College members in 2000 for both George W. Bush and Richard (Dick) Cheney 
on the theory that both were Texas residents). But such a move might itself turn off voters, espe-
cially in light of the marriage of the two candidates. 
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office will occur, and perhaps occur soon, is significant. History teaches that 
the sort of leader who successfully runs for the presidency may well aspire 
to remain in high-profile national service after that person’s two stints as 
chief executive have come and gone.20 Indeed, it was just such an occur-
rence that gave rise to the Twenty-Second Amendment, following Franklin 
Roosevelt’s pursuit of both a third and a fourth term in the Presidency, in 
contravention of an already-well-established tradition.21 In 1960, Dwight 
Eisenhower seems to have given thought to seeking the vice-presidency 
after serving two full terms as President;22 there was talk again in 1964 
about a possible Goldwater-Eisenhower ticket;23 and pundits pushed for a 
Bill Clinton run for the vice-presidency in each of the four most recent pres-
idential races.24 
At least in the modern era, twice-serving Presidents have remained in 
the prime of life upon leaving office, while the forward march of medical 
science ensures that human lifespans will grow longer and longer.25 In addi-
tion, many voters—especially in times of crisis—may well deem it advisa-
ble to install in the nation’s second-highest office someone who already has 
on-the-job training as its chief executive. The broader point is that the con-
stitutional questions considered here could well become real-life problems 
at some point in the future. If and when those problems arise, they will trig-
                                                                                                                           
 20 See BRIAN C. KALT, CONSTITUTIONAL CLIFFHANGERS 141 (2012) (noting a variety of 
federal offices held by former Presidents). 
 21 See infra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 22 See Peabody & Gant, supra note 7, at 603–06. 
 23 See Volokh, supra note 1. 
 24 See, e.g., Tony Mauro, Would the Constitution Prevent a Gore-Clinton Ticket?, LEGAL 
INTELLIGENCER, July 21, 2000, at 7; Scott E. Gant & Bruce G. Peabody, How to Bring Back Bill, 
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (June 13, 2006), http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0613/p09s02-
coop.html [http://perma.cc/YXC4-CM4A]; Stephen Gillers, Opinion, The Next Best Thing to Be-
ing President, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/03/opinion/the-next-
best-thing-to-being-president.html [http://perma.cc/5YQV-SC6L]; Paul Goldman & Mark J. 
Rozell, Obama-Bubba Ticket Could Be Winner, POLITICO (Oct. 16, 2011, 9:05 PM), http://www.
politico.com/news/stories/1011/66096.html [http://perma.cc/U73H-V7BX]; Andrew Malcolm, 
Bradley Says “No” to Obama VP Job. What About Clinton? Not Her. Him!, L.A. TIMES (July 29, 
2008, 2:12 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/washington/2008/07/obama-vp.html [http://perma.
cc/U8J7-88VF]; Jack Shafer, Vice President Bill Clinton? Take 3, SLATE (Sept. 7, 2000, 3:18 
PM), http://www.slate.com/id/1006013 [http://perma.cc/MAV2-JU6D]; Joshua Spivak, Bill Clin-
ton for Vice President? Forget It, HIST. NEWS NETWORK (Mar. 22, 2004), http://www.history
newsnetwork.org/article/4165 [http://perma.cc/F6HC-VMMQ]. Not surprisingly, attention recent-
ly has come to focus on the future status of our most recently twice-elected President, Barack 
Obama. See Brian Beutler, A Modest Proposal: Barack Obama Should Be Hillary Clinton’s Run-
ning Mate, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/121533/hillary-
clinton-barack-obama-vice-president [http://perma.cc/87ZA-96X3].  
 25 See The Youngest Presidents in U.S. History, ABOUT.COM, http://history1900s.about.com/
od/worldleaders/a/youngpresidents.htm [http://perma.cc/7FZK-FJ86] (noting that, when they took 
office, Presidents Clinton and Bush were forty-six and fifty-four respectively, while President 
Obama was forty-seven at the time of his inauguration). 
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ger a legal confrontation of singularly high-stakes significance—perhaps 
lending added value to a thoroughgoing treatment of the legal issues pre-
pared outside the maelstrom of an ongoing political crisis. It is true that the 
trading of ideas on whether a two-time President can become Vice-
President “has become a recurring parlor game among political observ-
ers.”26 But this question has far more than a parlor game’s importance. It is 
a question of ongoing legal and practical significance, especially under a 
constitutional system designed to “endure for ages to come.”27 
Another reason to look hard at the questions considered here stems from 
the post-ratification history of the Twenty-Second Amendment. In fact, efforts 
to undo the Amendment have recurred over the past sixty years,28 pushed 
forward by leaders from both sides of the political aisle, including President 
Ronald Reagan.29 This history suggests that similar reform efforts could well 
take hold again in future years. In that event, any proper rethinking of the 
Twenty-Second Amendment will need to take into account all of its flaws, 
ambiguities, gaps, and unintended consequences. Critical in this regard is the 
mystery that surrounds that Amendment’s treatment of the vice-presidency. 
This Article thus sets the stage for an enriched discussion about whether to 
retain, repeal, or revise the Twenty-Second Amendment. It does so by laying 
bare the full—and troublingly expansive—range of interpretive conundrums 
that the Amendment has spawned. 
                                                                                                                           
 26 Albert, supra note 1, at 565. 
 27 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819). 
 28 See THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40864, PRESIDENTIAL TERMS AND 
TENURE: PERSPECTIVES AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 24, 26 (2009) (noting fifty-four proposals 
for repeal of the Twenty-Second Amendment since 1956). 
 29 Id. Other patrons of change (at least at some point in their careers) have included Presidents 
Truman, Eisenhower, Clinton, and Nixon. See Dwight D. Eisenhower, The President’s News Con-
ference of October 5, 1956, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 850 
(David C. Eberhart ed., 1958); Paul B. Davis, The Results and Implications of the Enactment of 
the Twenty-Second Amendment, 9 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 289, 290, 301 (1979) (noting President 
Truman’s opposition to the Amendment and President Nixon’s encouragement of outside efforts 
to repeal it); Peabody & Gant, supra note 7, at 601 (“At a number of points both Eisenhower and 
Reagan spoke out against the Amendment, and an effort to repeal it developed following Nixon’s 
reelection . . . .”); Baker, supra note 1 (noting Bill Clinton’s endorsement of a more limited ban on 
only “two consecutive terms” because “people are living much longer”). Many other prominent 
Americans have expressed the same view, including former Senator and presidential candidate 
Eugene McCarthy, Judge (and former White House Counsel) Abner Mikva, and former first lady 
Nancy Reagan. See Hat Trick, WASHINGTONIAN, Mar. 1997, at 34; Eugene J. McCarthy, Give 
Bush Another 100 Days, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/03/03/
opinion/give-bush-another-100-days.html [http://perma.cc/2U4Y-F8PA]; Elizabeth Mehren, Says 
She Lost Freedom of Speech as First Lady: Nancy Reagan’s Room at the Top: ‘Attic,’ L.A. TIMES 
(June 4, 1989), http://articles.latimes.com/1989-06-04/news/mn-2659_1_first-lady-nancy-reagan-
mrs-reagan-raisa-gorbachev [http://perma.cc/DXB3-H2VC]. Moreover, a survey by Representa-
tive Stewart Udall, even though conducted within a decade of the Amendment’s ratification, indi-
cated that historians and political scientists also broadly favored repeal. Peabody & Gant, supra 
note 7, at 602 n.173 (citing 103 CONG. REC. 843 (1957)). 
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Finally, the questions considered here are worthy of attention because 
of the broader lessons they offer for all who consider with thoughtfulness 
the nature of our legal system. The question, “Can a twice-elected President 
become Vice-President?” has attracted wide and recurring attention in the 
news media.30 This attention stems in part from the role of celebrity in 
American life. But it also reflects something more—the deep and serious 
interest that Americans rightly share in the presidential office and those who 
might come to occupy it. Inquisitiveness about such matters flows, as well, 
from the fascination that the ever-churning interaction of our law and our 
politics inspires in a large segment of the American public. For many of us, 
a core question presses for an answer: How can it be that ongoing interpre-
tive disagreements swirl around even the most basic matters of constitution-
al organization? This Article tells the remarkable story of how—in the midst 
of a fast-moving and divisive political drama—the drafters of the Twenty-
Second Amendment could and did fail to address in a direct way key ques-
tions about vice-presidential service. The telling of this story not only 
shines a light on the limited reach of the Twenty-Second Amendment; it 
also offers lessons for future leaders about the risks and complexities of un-
dertaking the hard work of constitutional reform. 
I. THE TOTAL-INELIGIBILITY APPROACH 
Assume that it is late August 2016, just hours after the conclusion of 
the Democratic National Convention. Over the past three days, the follow-
ing headlines have appeared in the New York Times: (1) “Dems Set to Nom-
inate President Clinton as Vice-President;” (2) “Bill Clinton Pushes Value of 
Past Service in Accepting VP Nomination;” and (3) “Lawyers Prepare To 
Challenge Democrats’ Choice for Vice-President.” As the final headline 
reports, Republicans are about to let loose a flood of litigation in which they 
will claim that the Constitution prohibits Bill Clinton’s name from appear-
ing on the ballot. Who has the stronger position in this dispute—would-be 
Vice-President Bill Clinton or his political and legal adversaries? 
Answering this question requires close examination of three constitu-
tional provisions. Article II, Section 1, Clause 5—a part of the original Con-
stitution, which was ratified in 1788—provides in relevant part: 
                                                                                                                           
 30 See, e.g., Richard Albert, The Evolving Vice Presidency, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 811, 857 n.314 
(2005) (noting the publication of five separate pieces in such sources as Findlaw, Slate Magazine, 
and the Washington Times, over a period of less than ten months, that took conflicting views on 
the issue); Baker, supra note 1; Tom Curry, Could Bill Clinton Be Vice President?, MSNBC (Feb. 
20, 2008, 2:05 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/id/23254868/ [http://perma.cc/6LWH-FV8K]. See 
also NEALE, supra note 28, at 16 (noting that this “question . . . has been frequently asked over the 
years”). 
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No person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the Unit-
ed States, at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be 
eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any person be eli-
gible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thir-
ty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the Unit-
ed States.31 
The final sentence of the Twelfth Amendment, which was added to the Con-
stitution in 1804, reads as follows: 
[N]o person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President 
shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States.32 
And the first sentence of Section 1 of the Twenty-Second Amendment, 
which was ratified in 1951, states in its entirety: 
No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than 
twice, and no person who has held the office of President, or act-
ed as President, for more than two years of a term to which some 
other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of 
President more than once.33 
As indicated earlier, these three clauses have given rise to competing 
interpretations. On one view—which is defended here—the Twenty-Second 
Amendment did not dislodge the preexisting eligibility rules for the vice-
presidency that were established by Article II and the Twelfth Amendment, 
so that twice-before-elected Presidents can secure and serve in that office. 
But prominent scholars have argued the other side.34 The more far-reaching 
of their arguments posits that former two-term Presidents are entirely fore-
closed from assuming the vice-presidency either by election or appoint-
ment.35 On this view, the Twenty-Second and Twelfth Amendments operate 
in tandem to render such persons wholly “ineligible” to hold the presidency, 
                                                                                                                           
 31 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
 32 Id. at amend. XII. 
 33 Id. at amend. XXII, § 1. The second sentence of Section 1—the so-called transition 
clause—provides as follows:  
But this Article shall not apply to any person holding the office of President when 
this Article was proposed by the Congress, and shall not prevent any person who 
may be holding the office of President, or acting as President, during the term within 
which this Article becomes operative from holding the office of President or acting 
as President during the remainder of such term. 
Id. 
 34 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 35 See infra note 38 and accompanying text. 
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and thus similarly ineligible to become Vice-President.36 The following 
analysis demonstrates, however, that this contention is at odds with both the 
text of the relevant clauses and the history and purposes of the Twenty-
Second Amendment. 
A. Constitutional Text 
Some advocates of the two-time-Presidents-cannot-run-for-VP position 
invoke the canon of constitutional interpretation that focuses on the primacy 
of ordinary meaning.37 According to this argument, a prior-two-term Presi-
dent is “ineligible to the office of President”—and thus not “eligible” to be 
Vice-President under the Twelfth Amendment—because common usage indi-
cates that someone who cannot be elected to an office is ineligible for it. Pro-
fessor Amar, for example, emphasizes “the facts that the words ‘eligible’ and 
‘electable’ spring from the same Latin root, and that standard dictionaries 
have long included ‘electable’ as one of the standard definitions of eligi-
ble.’”38 Other commentators agree with this view.39 They urge that, because 
“eligibility” and “electability” are essentially synonymous terms, it makes no 
difference that the Twelfth Amendment speaks of the former, while the Twen-
ty-Second Amendment speaks of the latter. As Professor Amar has put the 
point: “[I]t would seem that a two term incumbent is ‘ineligible’ to the Presi-
dency (within the meaning of the Twelfth Amendment) precisely because he 
is made unelectable to that office (by the Twenty-second) . . . .”40 And so it 
follows for Professor Amar that such a person is “barred (by the Twelfth) 
from being elected to the vice presidency in the first place.”41 
The initial problem with this argument is that no dictionary can or does 
indicate that “eligible” and “electable” are interchangeable terms. We might 
                                                                                                                           
 36 U.S. CONST. amend. XII; id. at amend. XXII, § 1. 
 37 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 544 U.S. 570, 576 (2008) (“The Constitution was 
written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordi-
nary as distinguished from technical meaning.”) (quoting United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 
731 (1931)). 
 38 AMAR, supra note 1, at 436 n.8. In similar fashion, Professor Volokh notes that a dictionary 
published within decades after ratification of the Twelfth Amendment defined the term “eligibil-
ity” to mean “capacity to be elected.” Volokh, supra note 1. 
 39 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 1 (collecting earlier assertions of this position); see also Albert, 
supra note 1, at 565 (indicating that the vice-presidency “is an office for which a former two-term 
President is not eligible”). 
 40 AMAR, supra note 1, at 436 n.8. 
 41 Id.; accord Mathew J. Franck, Constitutional Sleight of Hand, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (July 
31, 2007, 9:02 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/51444/constitutional-sleight-
hand-matthew-j-franck [http://perma.cc/XQ84-AWDZ] (“It follows from the 22nd Amendment 
that Bill Clinton, being ‘constitutionally ineligible’ to be elected president, is ineligible to become 
president by another route. He is, in short, ineligible to be president, and therefore ineligible to 
become vice president under the 12th Amendment.”). 
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say, for example, that healthy, eighteen-year-old males are eligible for the 
draft. But we would never say that such persons are electable for the draft.42 
No less relevant is the basic distinction between the whole (which in this 
case might be eligibility) and the part (which in this case might be electabil-
ity).43 We can safely conclude, for example, that every sophomore is a stu-
dent; but that hardly means that every student is a sophomore. Likewise, it 
might be that every ineligible person is (for that reason) unelectable, but it 
would not follow that every unelectable person is ineligible—at least when, 
as here, the relevant office is attainable either by way of election or through 
other means.44  
In any event, whatever new or old dictionaries might say, the control-
ling texts of the Constitution itself signal that there is a critical difference 
between who is “eligible” to serve as President and who can be “elected” to 
that office. The Supreme Court has recognized two closely related princi-
ples of interpretation that powerfully support this conclusion.45 First, the 
“normal rule” is that “identical words used in different parts of the same act 
                                                                                                                           
 42 Professor Amar’s observation that “eligible” and “electable” have a shared Latin root is 
particularly unhelpful in this regard. The words “centipede” and “centenarian” have a shared Latin 
root. See Cent, Hundred, MEMBEAN, http://membean.com/wrotds/cent-hundred [http://perma.cc/
AT8Y-9ZLS] (noting that both words come from the latin root “cent,” meaning one hundred). But 
that fact hardly means that a bug and an old person are the same thing. 
 43 But see infra note 166 and accompanying text (suggesting inaccuracy of this supposition 
because of possible electability of a candidate who is ineligible for the presidency). 
 44 These “other means” entail succession to the presidency from the vice-presidency or other 
offices, including wholly non-electoral offices such as cabinet positions, according to the statutori-
ly established line of succession. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6; id. at amend. XX, § 4; id. at 
amend. XXV, § 1; 3 U.S.C. §  19 (2012) (creating a line of succession that begins, in order, with 
the Speaker of the House, the President pro tempore of the Senate, the Secretary of State, the Sec-
retary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, and the Attorney General). Depending on how 
one defines the term “election,” these other means might also include selection for the presidency 
by the House (pursuant to a majority vote on a state-by-state basis) in the event of an Electoral 
College deadlock. See Peabody & Gant, supra note 7, at 569 n.18, 571 n.29, 590 n.120 (discussing 
this scenario). Notably, many Americans may misunderstand the interaction of the Twelfth and 
Twenty-Second Amendments because they simply assume that the Twenty-Second wholly bars 
any further presidential service after two elections to that office. See id. at 565 (noting what “ap-
pears” to be a “commonly held view” to this effect). Indeed, even persons trained and experienced 
in the law sometimes incorrectly suggest that this is the case. See, e.g., Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d 
843, 846 (9th Cir. 1997) (describing the Twenty-Second Amendment as creating a “lifetime ban 
on the office of the President”); Halperin v. Kissinger, 434 F. Supp. 1193, 1195 (D.D.C. 1977), 
rev’d, 606 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1979), aff’d in part, cert. dismissed in part, 452 U.S. 713 (1981) 
(claiming that the Amendment creates a “prohibition” on “regaining the Office of President”). The 
key point is that pronouncements of this kind are wrong because the Twenty-Second Amendment 
inhibits only being “elected” to the presidency, and there are means other than election by which a 
person—including a former two-term President—may ascend to that office. 
 45 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 61–67 (2006); Gustafson v. Al-
loyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995). 
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are intended to have the same meaning.”46 Second, the Court “presumes 
that, where words differ, . . . [the drafter] has acted intentionally and pur-
posefully.”47 
Here, the parallel word choices that appear in Article II and the Twelfth 
Amendment, both of which specifically address who is “eligible” for office, 
contrast sharply with the different word choice that appears in the Twenty-
Second Amendment (which does not speak of eligibility, but instead speaks 
only of who “shall be elected”).48 Moreover, when Congress used the term 
“elected” in the Twenty-Second Amendment, it had squarely before it the 
preexisting language of Article II and the Twelfth Amendment.49 With these 
passages in plain view, the drafters easily could have written the Twenty-
Second Amendment to say “[n]o person shall be eligible” rather than “[n]o 
person shall be elected.”50 Indeed, there was no reason for them not to do so 
if they wished to impose an ineligibility rule. The framers of the Twenty-
Second Amendment, however, chose not to draft its text that way.51 For this 
simple reason, the Twenty-Second Amendment should be read to have a dif-
ferent effect than Article II, Section 1, Clause 5 with respect to the Twelfth 
Amendment.52 Thus, “eligibility” for purposes of the Twelfth Amendment is 
rightly seen as being different from—rather than the same as— “electability” 
for purposes of the Twenty-Second Amendment.53 
Proponents of the two-time-Presidents-cannot-run position might chal-
lenge this line of analysis as unduly nitpicky. It is, they could say, “a consti-
tution we are expounding,”54 so that less attention should be given to pre-
cise word choices than might be the case with an integrated, and more 
readily revisable, statutory code. Any claim that interpreters should look 
with a different eye on constitutional and statutory word choices is dubious 
to say the least.55 But even if this claim might have merit in other contexts, 
there is no reason to apply it when the constitutional drafters specifically 
considered and then repudiated the ready alternative of parallel word usage. 
Here, the finalized text of the Twenty-Second Amendment did not spring 
                                                                                                                           
 46 Gustafson, 513 U.S. at 570 (quoting Dep’t of Revenue v. ACF Indus., Inc., 510 U.S. 332, 
342 (1994)). It is worth noting in this regard that “[t]he rules applicable to the construction of a 
statute also apply to the construction of a Constitution.” See Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 
1080 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (citing Badger v. Hoidale, 88 F.2d 208, 211 (8th Cir. 1937)). 
 47 Burlington, 548 U.S. at 54. 
 48 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5; id. at amend. XII; id. at amend. XXII, § 1; see supra notes 2–
5 and accompanying text (setting forth relevant constitutional provisions). 
 49 See supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text (discussing relevant constitutional provisions) 
 50 U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1.  
 51 See id. 
 52 See id. at art. II, § 1, cl. 5; id. at amend. XII; id. at amend. XXII, § 1. 
 53 Id. at amend. XII; id. at amend. XXII, § 1. 
 54 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 407. 
 55 See supra note 46 (citing authority on this point). 
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out of thin air. It came into being only after a series of prior Twenty-Second 
Amendment drafts were put forward. And each of those earlier drafts spe-
cifically and tellingly used the term “eligible” or “ineligible,” in contrast to 
the final draft in which the word “elected” was substituted.56 
The journey that resulted in ratification of the Twenty-Second Amend-
ment began with the submission of proposed House Resolution 27.57 This 
Resolution specified that:  
No person shall be chosen or serve as President of the United 
States for any term, or be eligible to hold the office of President 
during any term, if such person shall have heretofore served as 
President during the whole or any part of each of any two sepa-
rate terms.58  
The House Judiciary Committee tinkered with this text to come up with an 
alternative formulation that provided instead: “Any person who has served 
as President of the United States during all or portions of any two terms, 
shall thereafter be ineligible to hold the office of President.”59 This version 
of the Amendment passed the House and was then sent to the upper cham-
ber.60 The Senate Judiciary Committee, however, again altered the operative 
text, so as to provide that: “A person who has held the office of President, or 
acted as President, on 365 calendar days or more in each of two terms shall 
not be eligible to hold the Office of President or to act as President for any 
part of another term . . . .”61 This Senate Judiciary Committee version—
with its “shall not be eligible to hold the Office” language front and cen-
ter—was the focal point of debate on the Senate floor.62 
As it turned out, the floor debate in the Senate produced much contro-
versy, which in turn triggered a late-stage move by reform advocates to pla-
cate objectors. Of critical importance, that move included substituting for 
the thrice-before-used rhetoric of “eligibility” the contrasting and now-
operative “[n]o person shall be elected” language.63 In due course, this Arti-
cle will explain why the political give-and-take that led to this new phrasing 
undermines the effort to read the Constitution to preclude a twice-before-
elected President from seeking the vice-presidency.64 But even on its face, 
                                                                                                                           
 56 See infra notes 57–62 and accompanying text (discussing earlier formulations of what be-
came the Twenty-Second Amendment). 
 57 See 93 CONG. REC. 841 (1947) (setting forth the initial proposal). 
 58 Id. at 849 (emphasis added). 
 59 Id. at 863 (emphasis added). 
 60 Id. at 872. 
 61 Id. at 1680 (emphasis added). 
 62 See id. at 1680–81, 1770–81. 
 63 See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text. 
 64 See infra notes 71–114 and accompanying text (Part I, section B). 
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this shift in wording signaled a shift in meaning. Well-settled principles dic-
tate, after all, that courts “will not assume that Congress intended ‘to enact 
statutory language that it has earlier discarded in favor of other lan-
guage.’”65 And there is no sound reason for concluding that this same prin-
ciple of contrasting word usage should not apply to the congressional 
choice of terms incorporated into constitutional amendments.66 
Indeed, two specialized considerations strongly bolster the case for ap-
plying this principle here. First, Congress did not merely displace the phrase 
“shall not be eligible” with the phrase “shall [not] be elected.” Rather, it 
embraced the latter phrasing only after proposals that focused on eligibility 
had been put forward not once, not twice, but three separate times, at earlier 
critical stages of the drafting process.67 Second, this change in word choice 
took hold in a context where the previously proposed eligibility-focused 
terminology did not simply stand on its own; instead, that language directly 
tracked the eligibility-focused terminology already set forth in Article II, 
Section 1 and in the Twelfth Amendment.68 It bears repeating that the textu-
alist argument for excluding two-time Presidents from the vice-presidency 
                                                                                                                           
 65 Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 93 (2001) (quoting Immigration & Natu-
ralization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 443 (1987) (quoting Nachman Corp. v. Pen-
sion Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 392–93 (1980))); accord, e.g., Russello v. United States, 
464 U.S. 16, 23–24 (1983) (“Where Congress includes limiting language in an earlier version of a 
bill but deletes it prior to enactment, it may be presumed that the limitation was not intended.”). 
The transformation from the initial version of the Twenty-Second Amendment to its finalized and 
ratified text is particularly telling in this regard. Taking care to cover all bases, that initial proposal 
began with the words “[n]o person shall be chosen or serve as President . . . or be eligible to hold 
the office of President.” (emphasis added). In contrast, the finalized Amendment stated only that 
“[n]o person shall be elected.” U.S. CONST. amend. XXII. This contrast in phrasing indicates with 
clarity that the ultimately adopted Twenty-Second Amendment addressed only (to use the lan-
guage of the original proposal) who “shall be chosen”––that is, elected––as President. According-
ly, it did not establish a rule about the separate subject of who is “eligible to hold the office of the 
President.” 
 66 See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing rules of construction). 
 67 See Patriotic Veterans, Inc. v. Indiana, 736 F.3d 1041, 1053 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting con-
trasting language in “earlier, un-enacted drafts” of the relevant law). Notably, other proposed 
versions of the Amendment identified in the legislative discussions also deployed the language of 
eligibility. A substitute Amendment offered by Representative Cellar, for example, began with the 
phrase “[n]o person shall be eligible.” 93 CONG. REC. 863; see, e.g., id. at H849 (statement of 
Rep. Jenkins) (advocating text that provided “[n]o person shall be chosen or serve as President of 
the United States for any term, or be eligible to hold the office of President during any term” (em-
phasis added)). In addition, Congressman Howard Robison noted that he and others had previous-
ly put forward proposals “making ineligible any person who has served as President for a whole or 
part of two separate terms.” Id. at 849 (statement of Rep. Robison) (emphasis added). The contrast 
between the final Amendment and all of these formulations—like the contrast between the final 
Amendment and the three earlier versions that were formally submitted to the House and the Sen-
ate—reveals the sharp change in textual direction marked by text of the final, and ultimately rati-
fied, Twenty-Second Amendment. 
 68 See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text (quoting eligibility-centered terms of Article 
II, Section 1, Clause 5 and the Twelfth Amendment). 
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ultimately rests on the Twelfth Amendment’s declaration that “[n]o person 
constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that 
of Vice-President.” Thus, precisely because earlier drafts of the Twenty-
Second Amendment used the language of eligibility, they would have (if 
properly ratified) rendered twice-elected Presidents “ineligible to the office 
of the President” and thus not “eligible” for the vice-presidency in light of 
the Twelfth Amendment’s constitutional command. But in the final version 
of the Twenty-Second Amendment, Congress abandoned the very language 
of eligibility on which operation of the Twelfth Amendment depends with 
regard to its treatment of vice-presidential service. The key point is plain to 
see: It is strained in the extreme to say that the Twenty-Second Amendment 
established a rule of ineligibility for purposes of the Twelfth Amendment 
when Congress, in forging the final version of the Twenty-Second Amend-
ment, chose to jettison the very language on which the argument for ineligi-
bility based on the Twelfth Amendment hinges.69 
In sum, there are many reasons why the final choice of phrasing of the 
Twenty-Second Amendment signals that twice-before-elected Presidents 
remain “eligible” to serve as Vice-President. But the key reason appears on 
the face of the relevant texts themselves: the Twenty-Second Amendment—
in striking contrast to the Twelfth Amendment and Article II, Section 1, 
Clause 5—does not use the language of eligibility, but instead uses the 
starkly different language of electability.70 
B. The Confirmatory Legislative History 
Proponents of the position that two-term Presidents are ineligible for 
the vice-presidency might try to draw a different inference from Congress’s 
textual change of direction. Indeed, they might seek to stand the con-
trasting-usage argument on its head by asserting that the sequence of legis-
lative events supports equating the final version of the Twenty-Second 
Amendment with its draft-stage progenitors. On this view, the repeated ref-
erences to eligibility in early incarnations of the Amendment demonstrate 
that the phrase “[n]o person shall be elected” was meant to carry forward, 
rather than to abandon, a principle of ineligibility. At the least—so the ar-
gument goes—this conclusion should win the day because there is no good 
                                                                                                                           
 69 Put another way, the argument that a twice-elected President cannot become a Vice-
President hinges on the last sentence of the Twelfth Amendment, which specifies that “no person 
constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of 
the United States.” U.S. CONST. amend. XII (emphasis added). Yet, the emphasized language is 
the very language that the architects of the Twenty-Second Amendment initially planned to use, 
but then specifically abandoned. 
 70 Compare id. at amend. XXII, § 1, with id. at art. II, § 1, cl. 5, and id. at amend. XII. 
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reason to believe that this eleventh-hour change in phrasing resulted from 
anything more than an unthinking slip of the scrivener’s pen. 
This argument is unavailing. To begin with, as we already have seen, it 
flouts the accepted rule of interpretation that views a shift in word usage as 
signifying a change in (rather than a retention of) preexisting textual mean-
ing.71 Another problem is that the not-electable-really-means-not-eligible 
interpretation would reward and encourage particularly sloppy legislative 
draftsmanship.72 One more problem is that this claim of unchanged intent 
rests on precious little more than pure speculation about Congress’s line of 
thinking.73 The deepest flaw in this approach, however, lies in the errone-
ousness of its underlying premise—namely, that a mere lapse of attentive-
ness best explains the shift in word choice, from terms of eligibility to terms 
of electability, in the final stage of crafting the Twenty-Second Amendment. 
In fact, this shift in word choice was not an unintended slip-up or anything 
close to it. Instead, the switch in wording was a purposeful drafting move 
                                                                                                                           
 71 See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text. 
 72 See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2506 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting 
proposition that courts can interpret a text to have a meaning inconsistent with what the words 
themselves indicate because doing so, among other things, “encourages congressional lassitude”); 
see also Goldman & Rozell, supra note 24 (indicating that if proponents of presidential term limits 
wanted to establish a rule of ineligibility, as opposed to a rule of non-electability, they “made a 
rookie legal mistake”). Moreover, it would be especially inappropriate to accept a sloppiness-
rewarding result in this context because members of Congress were well aware of the need for 
special care in drafting a new provision of the Constitution. As Representative Earl Michener 
noted during debate in the House:  
[T]he language of a constitutional amendment is most important, more so than in the 
case of ordinary legislation. Every comma, every semi-colon, every capital letter, 
every word means something in a constitutional amendment, and under these cir-
cumstances we should not lightly adopt language in a constitutional amendment that 
has not been thoroughly weighed. 
93 CONG. REC. 870. 
 73 Two facts are of particular salience in this regard. First, throughout the legislative discus-
sions, virtually no attention was given to the effect of the proposed Amendment on the vice-
presidency. Second, to the extent that some treatment of the subject can be squeezed out of the 
legislative materials, it provides a basis for concluding that Congress did not mean to inhibit elec-
tion to that office. In particular, Senator Wilbert Lee O’Daniel formally submitted a proposal that 
(in contrast to the President-centric versions of the Amendment that consistently occupied legisla-
tors’ attention) specified that “no person who shall have served as President or Vice President 
shall be eligible for election to the office of President or the office of Vice President.” 93 CONG. 
REC. 1794 (statement of Sen. O’Daniel) (emphasis added). Congress, however, never latched onto 
this sort of Vice-President-limiting phraseology. See id. at 1963 (noting that Senator O’Daniel’s 
proposal was rejected by a vote of one to eighty-two). As to legislative discussions, Senator 
O’Daniel indicated that the Twenty-Second Amendment placed a limitation on only the presiden-
cy, as opposed to any other office. See id. (“We are now considering placing a limitation on the 
Presidency. Why should we apply a limitation on only one Federal office[?]”). And no one at any 
time objected to this description of the Amendment’s effect. 
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made in the context of an inter-party showdown that rendered the modifica-
tion rife with significance. 
The critical events occurred in the Senate.74 On March 5, 1947, mem-
bers of the upper chamber started in on a lengthy discussion of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee’s “shall not be eligible” proposal.75 The lines of en-
gagement were clearly drawn. Senate Republicans overwhelmingly, if not 
unanimously, supported the Committee proposal.76 But the two-thirds-vote 
requirement for promulgating constitutional amendments forced them to 
build a coalition with Democratic colleagues. Doing so proved to be no 
easy task. Many Democrats saw this proposal as a slap in the face of their 
recently deceased standard-bearer, Franklin Roosevelt.77 Also in the air 
were claims that the reform would do away with an electoral prerogative 
wisely endorsed by the framers themselves.78 Picking up on the writings of 
Alexander Hamilton, for example, some Democratic Senators argued that 
imposing a presidential term limit would tie the hands of voters, in a coun-
                                                                                                                           
 74 See generally Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 390 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (noting 
that “when interpreting the text of a constitutional amendment it is common for courts to look for 
guidance in the proceedings of the Congress that authored the provision”). 
 75 93 CONG. REC. 1680. 
 76 Indeed, when the final vote in the Senate occurred, all forty-three Republicans present and 
voting were joined by sixteen mostly southern and border-state Democratic Senators to achieve 
the necessary two-thirds majority. NEALE, supra note 28, at 15. 
 77 See, e.g., 93 CONG. REC. 1947 (statement of Sen. Kilgore) (“Why has this question been 
raised again, Mr. President? The people are not crying out for a two-term limitation. Then why has 
the issue been raised again? Of course, the reason is that some Members of Congress are anxious 
to do everything possible to discredit one of the most progressive Presidents this Nation has ever 
known.”); id. at 1866 (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“Nothing could be more evident from the debate 
this afternoon than that the Republican Party, the majority party, is still looking backward. It is 
still the party of fear. What do they fear? They are afraid, Mr. President, of the voice of a ghost, of 
the only man who was ever reelected President 3 times. They are afraid of him, and they are now 
endeavoring to legislate against Franklin D. Roosevelt.”); id. at 1776 (statement of Sen. Hill) 
(“There are legitimate reasons why one might support this resolution; but surely there are some 
who would support it in an effort to repudiate the memory, the work, and the immortal services of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt.”); id. at 842 (statement of Rep. Sabath) (“What hurts most, and what I 
strongly resent, are statements made by several Republican Members that they ‘must vote for this 
anti-Roosevelt resolution.’ . . . It was a God-send . . . to the world that we had Franklin D. Roose-
velt, whom the people freely chose four times to direct our Government and our destinies . . . .”); 
see also ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY, at xv (2004) (calling the 
Twenty-Second Amendment an act of “posthumous revenge” against President Roosevelt); 
NEALE, supra note 28, at 14 (citing concerns about “retroactive vindictiveness”). 
 78 See, e.g., 93 CONG. REC. 844 (statement of Rep. Halleck) (noting that the Constitution was 
ratified “without a specific limitation on Presidential tenure” despite a proposal for one); id. at 842 
(statement of Rep. Sabath) (“Anyone familiar with the history of the formation of the Union . . . 
knows that it was not the purpose of the delegates . . . to [the Philadelphia] convention, nor of any 
of those who agreed to the language of the Constitution, to restrict the right of the people to 
choose their President freely, nor to limit the terms which a President could serve.”). See generally 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton) (offering detailed argument as to why the Presi-
dent “is to be re-eligible as often as the people of the United States shall think him worthy of their 
confidence”). 
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ter-republican fashion, even when conditions of emergency might well lead 
them to want to keep a battle-tested Commander in Chief at the helm.79 Not 
all Democrats were dead set against reform.80 But even those Democrats 
who saw value in some type of term limit tended to view the pending Re-
publican proposal as reaching too far.81 That proposal, as we have seen, 
provided that any person who had served “365 calendar days or more in 
each of two terms” would thereafter not be “eligible” for the presidency.82 
As the risk of impasse grew, one key spokesman for each party stepped 
forward: Democratic Senator Warren Magnuson of Washington and Repub-
lican Senator Robert Taft of Ohio. Magnuson assailed the then-pending ver-
sion of the Amendment. He argued that it could limit a President to an over-
all tenure that was far too short, and indeed sometimes deny the public “the 
right to endorse him” for even a single full term although he already had 
“done a good job.”83 Magnuson therefore offered a “substitute amendment,” 
which broke sharply away from earlier submissions. This proposal stated 
simply that “[n]o person shall be elected to the Office of President more 
than twice.”84 A string of Democrats spoke in favor of this new approach, 
while not a single party member voiced support for the contrasting, eligibil-
ity-limiting Republican measure.85 Meanwhile, other Democrats objected to 
any form of constitutional tinkering. Senator J. Lister Hill, for example, ad-
                                                                                                                           
 79 See, e.g., 93 CONG. REC. 1970 (statement of Sen. Pepper) (“I am saying only this, that what 
is proposed here is to limit the right and the power of the American people in a moment of great 
crisis . . . to elect a man . . . whom they deem best fitted to lead them through the crucial time.”); 
id. at 1948 (statement of Sen. Kilgore) (arguing “the number of Presidential terms should not be 
limited, because we might deprive the American people of the services of the best man in any 
emergency, the man who knew the most about it, who had the inside facts, who was conversant 
with the situation”); see also id. at 1941 (statement of Sen. Holland) (“I should hate to have the 
Nation put in the position that such a person could not be called back to the Presidency.”); id. at 
1778 (statement of Sen. Lucas) (“It is in violation of a fundamental principle of human rights. I 
consider the proposal dangerous to our liberties.”); id. at 1771 (statement of Sen. Hill) (“[T]he 
pending amendment to the Constitution would place the wisdom of the people in a straight-jacket. 
It would be a limitation on their right of free election.”). 
 80 See infra note 91 and accompanying text (discussing statement of Senator Millard Tydings).  
 81 See infra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing Democrat support for a later, more 
voter-friendly proposal). 
 82 See supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing Senate Judiciary Committee proposal). 
 83 93 CONG. REC. 1865 (statement of Sen. Magnuson). The most basic difficulty was that, 
according to the terms of the pending proposal, a person who served as President by way of suc-
cession for only 730 days—that is, two stints via succession of 365 days—could never be elected 
to serve as President at all. 
 84 Id. at 1863 (emphasis added). 
 85 See, e.g., id. at 1864 (statement of Sen. Connally) (“It seems to me that opposition to such a 
provision is not tenable.”); id. (statement of Sen. Tydings) (“I think the amendment is a good 
one.”); id. at 1863 (statement of Sen. McClellan) (noting that he “very much favor[ed] the Sena-
tor’s amendment”). Of significance, these expressions of support came from southern and border-
state Senators, with whom Republicans had to build a coalition to secure supermajority adoption 
of the Amendment. See supra note 76 (discussing the final vote). 
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vanced the position that “the question of who should be elected President 
and how long he should serve should remain where it has been for the past 
150 years, that is, in the sound judgment and the wisdom of the people of 
the United States.”86 
On the Republican side, Senator Taft now assumed the starring role. 
He expressed his own view that the Magnuson proposal was too lax because 
it would permit a Vice-President-turned-President to serve almost all of an 
initial term and then serve two more full terms based on direct election to 
the presidential office.87 Even so, Taft extended an olive branch. He encour-
aged fellow Republicans to seek a middle ground with Magnuson, because 
“[w]e cannot adopt the amendment unless the Democrats, or a large number 
of them, join in voting for it.”88 In response to this overture, Magnuson 
showed no sign of letting up. Taft, however, sensed an opening for com-
promise. He therefore moved for a recess, and the full Senate went along 
with the suggestion.89 
For the next two days, Taft threw himself into finding a way to break 
through the legislative stalemate. His effort centered on collaborating with 
Maryland Democrat Millard Tydings,90 who had expressed support for the 
Magnuson formulation but also signaled a willingness to bargain.91 The re-
sult was a new version of the Twenty-Second Amendment—the so-called 
Taft-Tydings proposal—which was ultimately approved by Congress and 
ratified by the states. 
The Taft-Tydings proposal did two main things. First, it left in place 
the “[n]o person shall be elected to the office of the President” verbiage of 
the Magnuson substitute amendment, thus scuttling the earlier “shall not be 
eligible” language endorsed by the Senate Judiciary Committee and prede-
cessor drafts that had surfaced in the House.92 Second, the compromise 
formulation loosened the Amendment’s application to Vice-Presidents-
turned-President by embracing a new approach to past presidential service. 
Under this revised rule, the ban on two elections as President would kick in 
                                                                                                                           
 86 93 CONG. REC. 1865 (statement of Sen. Hill). 
 87 See id. (statement of Sen. Taft) (“I think it would be a great mistake to say that after a man 
had been President for 3 years, he should then be eligible for two more terms, serving a total of 11 
years.”). 
 88 Id. at 1867. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 1938 (statement of Sen. Wiley) (noting the key role of Senator Tydings in forging the 
final version compromise with Senator Taft). 
 91 Id. at 1863 (statement of Sen. Tydings) (describing the committee draft as “a little strin-
gent” and expressing the view, even while supporting the Magnuson proposal, that “there may be 
good reasons why the committee amendment is preferable”; also focusing on the need to craft a 
text that created “a better chance of adoption” in the state legislatures). 
 92 Id. at 1938 (setting forth the Taft-Tydings proposal); see also supra notes 57–62 and ac-
companying text (describing earlier versions). 
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only after a candidate had previously served “more than two years of a term 
to which some other person was elected President,” and no person would be 
foreclosed from running for President at least once.93 This reworked text 
thus abandoned the Senate Judiciary Committee’s approach of equating 
“more than 365 days” spent in the presidential office to a full electoral term, 
while also doing away with the idea that some Vice-Presidents-turned-
President might never be able to present themselves to the voters for elec-
tion to the presidency at all.94 In sum, the thrust of the Taft-Tydings revision 
was to expand voter choice in keeping with the preferences of Senator 
Magnuson and his Democratic colleagues.95 
No Senator discussed with specificity the legal significance of the new 
“[n]o person shall be elected” language during the floor debates that fol-
lowed submission of the Taft-Tydings proposal. But anyone who was pay-
ing attention knew these things: (1) this new and obviously altered election-
focused language had been put forward initially by Senator Magnuson;96 (2) 
the Magnuson proposal, including its “[n]o person shall be elected” lan-
guage, was designed to respond to widespread concern about the scope of 
the then-pending draft’s displacement of the preexisting norm of voter au-
tonomy in executive branch elections;97 (3) Senate Republicans, now led by 
Taft, were prepared to respond to these concerns of their Democratic col-
leagues in a meaningful way;98 (4) one mechanism for doing so was to ac-
cept Magnuson’s shift from focusing on presidential eligibility (which, un-
der the Twelfth Amendment, affected vice-presidential eligibility, in a di-
rect, text-specific way) to focusing on presidential electability (which, un-
der the Twelfth Amendment, did not);99 and (5) this shift in phrasing, to-
gether with substitution of the new and liberalizing two-year-prior service 
rule, produced the text that a two-thirds majority could and did vote to ac-
cept.100 
                                                                                                                           
 93 See supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing language of the Twenty-Second 
Amendment as ratified). 
 94 See supra note 83 (discussing Senator Magnuson’s critique of the proposed language). 
 95 In addition, the Taft-Tydings formulation altered the Amendment’s transition clause in a 
way that expanded voter autonomy with respect to future elections involving then-sitting President 
Truman. See infra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 96 See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text (statement of Senator Magnuson). 
 97 See supra notes 78–86 and accompanying text (discussing concerns about voter autonomy); 
see also, e.g., 93 CONG. REC. 1865 (statement of Sen. Magnuson). 
 98 See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text (discussing Republican response). 
 99 See supra note 92 and accompanying text (discussing Taft-Tydings proposal). 
 100 Later events in the amendment-framing process confirmed the seriousness of the objec-
tions of Senator Magnuson and other Democrats to the restrictions imposed by the then-draft of 
the Twenty-Second Amendment. This is so because after negotiations produced the final version 
of the Amendment, Senator Magnuson moved to an even more pro-voter-freedom-driven position, 
which would have barred voters only from electing a President “for more than two successive 
terms.” 93 CONG. REC. 1938. Although this position was rejected, it illustrates the context in 
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To be sure, there was no explicit discussion in the legislative proceed-
ings about how the refocusing of the Amendment from presidential eligibility 
to presidential electability would affect later runs for the vice-presidency. But 
every legislator understood that the baseline norm against which they were 
operating—a baseline norm put in place by the framers themselves—was 
one of wide-open voter freedom. Moreover, with regard to the future selec-
tion of Vice-Presidents, the final textual revisions of the Twenty-Second 
Amendment were highly consequential. Predecessor drafts—precisely be-
cause they spoke of presidential eligibility—had clearly brought the last 
sentence of the Twelfth Amendment into play. Unlike these earlier drafts, 
however, the final version of the Twenty-Second Amendment did not map 
onto the eligibility-focused language of the Twelfth Amendment.101 Thus, it 
did not displace the background norm of free voter choice for Vice-
Presidents as a textual matter—far less displace it with anything approach-
ing the measure of clarity one would expect if Congress were seeking to cut 
back on the long-settled and fundamental rule of republican self-
governance.102 
The critical point is this: It was only the Magnuson-inspired final text 
of the Twenty-Second Amendment that generated the requisite supermajori-
ty approval in the Senate and the House. No prior proposals generated such 
support. And from all appearances, none of them would have.103 Yet it was 
only those prior proposals that purported to create an eligibility rule.104 
Thoughtful scholars have rightly noted that the final phrasing of the 
Twenty-Second Amendment was the result of a cross-party compromise.105 
But they have failed to communicate the full importance of this compro-
                                                                                                                           
which final negotiations occurred, which included continuing pressure to loosen the Amendment’s 
restrictions on free voter choice. 
 101 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1, with id. at amend. XII. 
 102 See infra notes 131–137 and accompanying text (discussing the longstanding rule of self-
governance). 
 103 See supra notes 74–89 and accompanying text (discussing debate surrounding prior pro-
posals). 
 104 Put another way, it is simply impossible to know what would have happened if Senator 
Taft had insisted on retaining the Senate Judiciary Committee’s “not eligible” phrasing. And this 
is especially true because opposition to the then-pending draft appeared to be mounting at the 
time, pushed forward in particular by concerns that the committee draft too greatly inhibited the 
rights of voters. If Senator Taft had eschewed the phrasing offered by Senator Magnuson, would 
fence-sitting Democrats have seen the change back as a slap in the face? Would detailed discus-
sions have ensued about the difference between the eligibility and the electability of Presidents? 
Would follow-up questions about vice-presidential succession rights and durational limits on pres-
idential service have attracted attention and concern? Would resulting discord have triggered a 
new wave of Democrat intransigence? And might that discord have resulted in scotching the 
amendment project altogether? We cannot know the answers to these questions for one critical 
reason: Senator Taft and his fellow Republicans chose to go along with Senator Magnuson’s oper-
ative “[n]o person shall be elected” language. 
 105 Peabody & Gant, supra note 7, at 598–99. 
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mise because they have not highlighted its most noteworthy features. In 
effect, Democrats were given the last word on whether the Amendment 
should include the term “eligible” or the term “elected.” In addition, they 
were given this choice in a setting where the difference mattered precisely 
because the latter phrasing was tied to a narrowing of the Amendment’s ef-
fect and thus to expanding the range of voter autonomy in keeping with the 
wishes of a large number of federal lawmakers.106 In these circumstances, to 
dismiss the change in phrasing as inconsequential is to blink reality. And 
that is all the more the case because the change concerned the provision’s 
basic operative effect,107 was caught up with preexisting terms of the Con-
stitution itself,108 was put forward at the decisive moment in the legislative 
process,109 was part of carefully planned Republican effort to mollify doubt-
ing Democrats,110 and was endorsed in a setting where those Republicans 
had far “bigger fish to fry.”111 
Looking at the events of 1947 from a broader angle helps to bring the 
key point into focus. It was the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt that 
framed the thinking of every political representative who was called on to 
consider the Twenty-Second Amendment.112 Moreover, the case of FDR 
involved the seeking of reelection as President by an already long-serving 
President. Building on this idea, Senator Taft and others expressed worries 
about reelecting for a third stint of presidential service someone who (due to 
succession) had already served more, and perhaps significantly more, than 
six years as President.113 Neither Senator Taft nor any other House or Sen-
ate member, however, expressed any concern about electing a former Presi-
dent as Vice-President, and the reason why is apparent: This possibility was 
far removed from the sort of overreaching that reformers perceived in the 
                                                                                                                           
 106 See supra notes 79–86 and accompanying text (noting discussions of voter autonomy). 
 107 This is so because the inhibition-imposing language of the ultimately adopted Amendment 
was “[n]o person shall be elected.” It was, in other words, this phrase that specifically focused on 
and defined the operative legal impact of being twice before elected President—in contrast to the 
prior (and rejected) inhibition-imposing language that “[n]o person shall be eligible.” 
 108 See supra notes 46–54 and accompanying text (discussing rules of constitutional construc-
tion). 
 109 See supra notes 83–100 and accompanying text (discussing the Taft-Tydings proposal). 
 110 See supra notes 88–92 and accompanying text (discussing Taft’s strategy). 
 111 See infra notes 112–114 and accompanying text (discussing concerns about an individual 
holding the presidency for more than two terms). 
 112 The best evidence of this point is that, time after time, legislators referenced the departure 
by President Roosevelt from the longstanding two-term tradition initiated by President George 
Washington. See 93 CONG. REC. 1956 (noting that Roosevelt’s decision to break the two-term 
precedent served as the impetus for constitutional reform). 
 113 See infra notes 115–116, 122 and accompanying text (discussing congressional concern 
about an individual holding the presidency for too long). 
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actions of Franklin Roosevelt.114 Put simply, when the Magnuson revision 
cropped up, Senator Taft and his Republican colleagues kept their eyes on 
the prize. They recognized that the phrasing of either the Senate Judiciary 
Committee draft or the Magnuson proposal would block self-perpetuating 
reelections by a single person to the presidency itself. That was the crux of 
the reformers’ agenda. That was what they sought. That is what they got. 
But they got nothing more. They got nothing more because the language 
they accepted from the Magnuson revision took them only that far. 
C. The Argument from Constitutional Purpose and Spirit 
Critics of this text-and-history-driven analysis may claim that it misses 
the forest for the trees. It is wrong, they might say, to give attention to the 
details of how the text of the Twenty-Second Amendment took shape in the 
churning vortex of legislative politics. More important in their view are the 
broad, thematic objectives of the Amendment. These analysts might assert 
that the Twenty-Second Amendment was designed to fend off any presiden-
tial tenure that is “too long”115 or of “undue length.”116 In particular, there 
are passages in the legislative record indicative of a design to keep future 
                                                                                                                           
 114 See, e.g., 93 CONG. REC. 1956 (statement of Sen. Lucas) (“No matter how any Member of 
the Senate may vote . . . truthful men know that the breaking of the two-term precedent by Franklin 
D. Roosevelt in 1940 and the further shattering of the precedent by his reelection in 1944 are the 
basic reasons for seeking this constitutional amendment.”); id. at 869 (statement of Rep. Smith) (“We 
ought to face the facts behind the resolution. As Republicans . . . we do not want to impose upon our 
country again one-man government such as we have had for the past 14 years, be he a Republican or 
a Democrat, be it Roosevelt or somebody else.”); id. at 848–49 (statement of Rep. Jenkins) (“The 
two-term rule for the position of President is an American tradition which was established by Wash-
ington, ratified by Jefferson in forceful and unambiguous language and likewise ratified expressly or 
impliedly by every other President until the day of Franklin D. Roosevelt. The tenure of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt proved that Washington and Jefferson were wise.”); see also Peabody & Gant, supra note 
7, at 570 (noting that “much of the proximate impetus for adopting the Twenty-Second Amendment 
seems to have derived from partisan opposition to the policies and legacies associated with Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt and his unprecedented four terms of presidential service”). 
 115 93 CONG. REC. 1865 (statement of Sen. Taft); accord id. at 1945 (statement of Sen. Rever-
comb) (“The real heart of the amendment is to prevent any individual from holding too long the 
office of Chief Executive.”); see also id. at 1680 (statement of Sen. Wiley) (“Too-long occupancy 
of the Presidential office and too-long continuance of the same administration always make for 
danger of dictatorship.”). 
 116 93 CONG. REC. 1946 (statement of Sen. Revercomb); see also id. at 1939 (“It seems to me 
that the principal purpose is to preserve government and protect it against extended tenure of of-
fice.”); id. at 865 (statement of Rep. Keating) (asserting that “some restraint upon the tenure of the 
President is desirable”). More relevant than isolated comments by individual legislators might be 
the official Senate Report, which spoke of establishing “a reasonable restriction on the possibility 
of an executive dynasty.” S. REP. NO. 80-34, at 2 (1947). But what constitutes a “reasonable re-
striction” and an “executive dynasty” are inherently open questions. And the argument seems 
particularly strong that an opportunity to serve as Vice President—as opposed to President—
presents little risk of creating a “dynasty” in the executive branch. 
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Presidents from serving more than a total of ten years.117 Permitting an al-
ready-eight-year President to become Vice-President, so the argument goes, 
would clash with these objectives because it could produce a period of total 
presidential service in excess of what the Amendment’s framers had in 
mind—for example, if an elected Vice-President was called on to assume a 
third term as President either on or shortly after inauguration day. 
This argument merits a close look because it builds on the uncontro-
versial notion that interpreters should consider a text’s underlying purpose 
in resolving any ambiguities that it presents.118 Moreover, this line of argu-
ment has found favor with well-credentialed observers.119 Indeed, its most 
prominent proponent may be former two-term President Bill Clinton him-
self, who expressed the view in early 2014 that a run by him for the vice-
presidency “would undermine the spirit of the Constitution.”120 What is one 
to make of President Clinton’s purposive analysis? Would it in fact offend 
the “spirit of the Constitution” in general—and the underlying aim of the 
Twenty-Second Amendment in particular—to permit a vice-presidential run 
by a twice-before-elected President? The far better answer is no. 
                                                                                                                           
 117 93 CONG. REC. 2389–90 (statement of Rep. Michener) (noting “[i]t would be conceivable 
that a President might serve 10 years,” and adding that “[t]he important thing is a definite limita-
tion of terms”); id. at 1956 (statement of Sen. Taft) (asserting that “if he [a successor President] 
has held office less than 2 years, he may be reelected twice and may serve a total of 10 years mi-
nus 1 day”); id. at 1945 (statement of Sen. Revercomb) (noting that the Amendment provides “a 
minimum limitation of 6 years and a maximum of 10”); id. at 1940 (statement of Sen. Taft) 
(“They will know that if the President lives for 2 years and then dies, they may possibly be Presi-
dent for 10 years if they are reelected twice.”); id. at 1938 (statement of Sen. Wiley) (“The sug-
gested amendment . . . proposes that if the person occupying the office had not held it for more 
than 2 years of the term of his predecessor he would be eligible to two elective terms and thus in 
effect could remain in the office for practically 10 years.”). 
 118 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Three Symmetries Between Textualist and Purposivist Theories 
of Statutory Interpretation—and the Irreducible Roles of Values and Judgments Within Both, 99 
Cornell L. Rev. 685, 718 (2014). See generally Victoria F. Nourse, Elementary Statutory Interpre-
tation: Rethinking Legislative Intent and History, 55 B.C. L. Rev. 1613 (2014) (discussing textual-
ist and purposivist theories of statutory interpretation). 
 119 See, e.g., KALT, supra note 20, at 144 (noting argument that “[t]he point of the Twenty–
Second Amendment is clearly to limit presidential service, and it should be interpreted that way” 
lest it “allow a president who is barred from a straightforward reelection to become president 
through ponderous constitutional convolutions”); Albert, supra note 30, at 857–59 (arguing 
against adherence to “myopic” and “narrow clause-bound textualist analysis” because it is more 
“constitutionally faithful” to embrace a “proper, holistic reading” of the Constitution under which 
“a two-term President may not again become President by serving as Vice President” and “fears of 
an imperial Vice Presidency” are negated). 
 120 In particular, in an interview with talk show host Jimmy Kimmel in April of 2014, when 
asked whether he would run for Vice-President, President Clinton replied, “I don’t believe I could 
do that. It would undermine the spirit of the Constitution.” Emily Heil, Bill Clinton on Jimmy 
Kimmel: ‘Most Days, I Don’t Miss’ White House, WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/blogs/reliable-source/wp/2014/04/03/bill-clinton-on-jimmy-kimmel-most-
days-i-dont-miss-white-house/ [http://perma.cc/3AZT-Y3Q8]. 
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Consider, for example, the argument of Professor Bruce Ackerman, 
who agrees with Professors Amar and Volokh that a twice-before-elected 
President cannot run for Vice-President. In defending this position, Profes-
sor Ackerman has written: “[T]he principle announced by the Twenty-
Second Amendment, limiting the president to two elected terms, represents 
a considered judgment by the American people, after Franklin Roosevelt’s 
lengthy stay in the White House, which deserves continuing respect.”121 
This purpose-based analysis, however, is laced with difficulties. Concern 
about “Franklin Roosevelt’s lengthy stay in the White House,” for example, 
does not carry over easily to a two-term President’s run for the vice-
presidency because the case of Franklin Roosevelt involved neither election 
to nor service in the vice-presidency, as opposed to the presidency itself.122 
Professor Ackerman suggests that electing a twice-before-elected President 
as Vice-President would subvert the Twenty-Second Amendment’s goal of 
“limiting the president to two elected terms.”123 A future run for the vice-
presidency, however, would not give a twice-before-elected President more 
than “two elected terms” to the presidency itself.124 And even on its face, 
the Twenty-Second Amendment does not “limit[] the President to two elect-
ed terms”; rather, it envisions that a President can serve for two elected 
terms following one or more part-terms of service, so long as each of those 
part-terms does not last “more than two years.”125 
                                                                                                                           
 121 BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK 204 n.34 (2006). 
 122 See supra notes 90–95 and accompanying text (discussing the Taft-Tydings proposal). To 
be sure, Senator Taft stated that: “I think it is a great mistake to say that a man may serve for 11 
years. I think that is too long.” 93 CONG. REC. 1865. But, in context, that assertion simply did not 
deal with whether a two-term President could run for Vice-President, especially in the absence of 
any effort to perpetuate one’s self in the presidency. In any event, even if Senator Taft would have 
preferred to install an under-any-circumstances ten-year limit on total presidential service, he 
simply did not write that limit into the Twenty-Second Amendment. And his choice in this regard 
was entirely sensible in light of his broader goal of getting his compromise redraft approved in the 
face of rising Democratic support for the Magnuson substitute amendment. See supra notes 75–90 
and accompanying text (discussing debate in the Senate following the initial proposal). 
 123 ACKERMAN, supra note 121, at 204 n.34. 
 124 See infra notes 151–170 and accompanying text (Part II, section B, explaining in detail 
why election as Vice-President is not fairly characterized as election as President). 
 125 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXII. This is the case, as we have seen, because the Amend-
ment’s limit on electability, based on past service as a successor President, comes into play only if 
the successor President has so served “for more than two years of a term.” Id. Indeed, the “two 
years of a term” language blows away any purpose-based argument based on loose discussions in 
the legislative debates about a supposed limit of ten years on presidential service. This is so be-
cause this language on its face created the possibility that someone could occupy the presidency 
for more than ten years—that is, when a person is elected to and serves as President for two full 
terms after previously succeeding to the presidency more than once (say, for one and a half years 
on two separate occasions). To be sure, such a result is unlikely. But so is a scenario under which 
a person would serve two full terms as President; would later be elected as Vice President; would 
still be in that position when a vacancy in the presidency occurs; would then be able to succeed to 
the presidency in a situation where the vacancy in that office arose less than halfway through the 
2015] Two-Time Presidents and the Vice Presidency 1311 
The broader point is that Professor Ackerman’s purpose-based argu-
ment hinges, as is often true in law, on the level of generality at which one 
characterizes the purpose of the relevant legal text. To be sure, some Sena-
tors expressed the view that Presidents should not serve for “too long.”126 
But what does “too long” mean? Does it mean eight years? Does it mean 
ten years? And if it is ten years, why should it bar a vice-presidential run by 
someone who so far has served only eight years as President? Should the 
purpose of preventing presidential service that is “too long” reach so far as 
to impose a prophylactic ban on the election of a Vice-President who prob-
ably will not succeed to the presidency at all and only rarely could succeed 
to that office for more than two years? And why in particular should anyone 
answer this question “yes” when the focal point of concern of the Amend-
ment’s drafters was an FDR-like third-term run for the presidency itself?127 
None of these questions answers itself. 
No less important, Professor Ackerman’s analysis does not take ade-
quate account of the full purpose of the framers of the Twenty-Second 
Amendment. That purpose, as the legislative history makes clear, was to 
strike a balance. On one side of the balance rested concerns about creating 
quasi-monarchy-like conditions through the repeated seeking and securing of 
multiple presidential terms.128 On the other side lay worries about stripping 
away the longstanding prerogatives of the American electorate to too great an 
extent.129 To focus on only the first side of this balance is to misapprehend the 
                                                                                                                           
four-year term; and thereafter would serve the full remainder of the term in uninterrupted fashion. 
Yet that is the scenario that is said to necessitate adoption, on purpose-based grounds, of the total-
ineligibility interpretation. 
 126 See supra notes 115, 122 and accompanying text (quoting Congressmen who expressed 
concern about Presidents serving for too long). 
 127 See supra notes 112–114 and accompanying text (discussing congressional concerns about 
another Roosevelt-like situation). 
 128 See, e.g., 93 CONG. REC. 1945 (statement of Sen. Revercomb) (urging that extending 
“power to any one man would be a definite step in the direction of autocracy, regardless of the 
name given the office, whether it be president, king, dictator, emperor, or whatever title the office 
may carry”); id. at 1780 (statement of Sen. O’Connor) (worrying that “some self-seeking leader 
may gain the Presidency and make use of the powers and privileges of that office to entrench 
himself therein”); id. at 1775 (statement of Sen. Overton) (expressing concern about repeated 
reelection of the President because of the “tremendous power which he has” and about the result-
ing risk that “we might drift into a dynasty”); id. at 860 (statement of Rep. Dolliver) (agreeing that 
the Amendment would counter “this tendency toward dictatorial government”); id. at 856 (state-
ment of Rep. McCowen) (viewing the Amendment as “a great step toward preventing a dictator-
ship or some totalitarian form of government from arising”); id. at 852 (statement of Rep. Jen-
nings) (favoring the Amendment because “[o]nly by its adoption can the people be assured that we 
shall never have a dictator in this land”); id. at 841 (statement of Rep. Allen) (attributing to 
George Washington a warning to citizens that they “might again be subject to the tyranny of mon-
archy if they permitted any individual to become too firmly entrenched as Chief Executive”). 
 129 See supra notes 78–86 and accompanying text (discussing concerns about voter autono-
my). 
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underlying forces that brought the Twenty-Second Amendment into being. 
Indeed, this is especially true because (as we have seen) the concerns of pro-
voter-choice advocates were accommodated, rather than thwarted, at the key 
last stage of the drafting process.130 
An enriched understanding of the aim of the Twenty-Second Amend-
ment invites the conclusion that its spirit—particularly when viewed in light 
of the spirit of the Constitution as a whole—supports, rather than under-
mines, the case for permitting two-time Presidents to seek the vice-
presidency. A centerpiece of the republican theory that drove the entire con-
stitutional project was identified by Alexander Hamilton at the New York 
Ratifying Convention: “[T]he true principle of a republic is, that the people 
should choose whom they please to govern them. . . . This great source of 
free government, popular election, should be perfectly pure and the most 
unbounded liberty allowed.”131 The Supreme Court has noted that James 
Madison shared the view that self-rule “is undermined as much by limiting 
whom the people can select as by limiting the franchise itself.”132 It is true 
that the Twenty-Second Amendment moved away from this basic structural 
choice to some degree. But it did so only by establishing a new limit with 
regard to being “elected” to “the office of President,”133 while not otherwise 
purporting to negate the overarching background postulate of uninhibited 
voter freedom.134 To the extent that the Twenty-Second Amendment dis-
                                                                                                                           
 130 See supra notes 83–100 and accompanying text (explaining how the Taft-Tydings pro-
posal assuaged concerns about voter autonomy). 
 131 2 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 257 (1876). At the same state ratifying convention, Robert Livingston agreed that 
“[t]he people are the best judges [of] who ought to represent them”; indeed, he went so far as to 
declare that “to tell them whom they shall not elect, is to abridge their natural rights.” Id. at 292–
93. 
 132 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969) (characterizing Madison’s statements at 
the Constitutional Convention). This overarching principle of republican-based electoral autono-
my was a deep-seated one in part because it grew out of the “bitter struggle for the right to freely 
choose representatives which had recently concluded in England” at the time the Constitution was 
framed. Id. at 542. 
 133 U.S. CONST. amend. XXII. 
 134 The Supreme Court has vindicated this basic norm in many cases, including by declaring 
that any “ambiguity” in the constitutional text, with regard to the analogous subject of congres-
sional elections, should be resolved in keeping with “this fundamental principle of our representa-
tive democracy.” Powell, 395 U.S. at 543. It is true that our founding charter established important 
differences between the methods of electing House and Senate members and the method of elect-
ing executive branch officials. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (setting forth the Electoral Col-
lege system); id. at amend. XXII (refining that system). But cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 
(2000) (noting that, with regard to actual operation of the Electoral College, “[h]istory has now 
favored the voter, and in each of the several States the citizens themselves vote for Presidential 
electors”). The Court has never suggested, however, that different principles of republicanism 
govern the core rights of voters in these two contexts. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 103–05 (citing prece-
dents with regard to legislator elections in the context of vindicating the rights of voters to secure 
equal treatment in voting for President and Vice-President). Indeed, the Court has found the need 
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placed this norm, it is controlling. But the “precious”135 and “fundamen-
tal”136 principle of free electoral choice—particularly with regard to the 
second highest office in the land—is not rightly brushed aside by way of a 
process of shadowy extrapolation, far less plain-text-defeating construction 
based on the supposed “spirit” of the Constitution.137 
This last point about the centrality of the constitutional text is the most 
salient of all. The preceding discussion shows that no strong argument 
based on the purpose of the Twenty-Second Amendment, far less the pur-
poses of the Constitution as a whole, supports rendering a twice-before-
elected President constitutionally ineligible for the vice-presidency. Indeed, 
as we have seen, the spirit of the Constitution points the other way.138 But 
                                                                                                                           
to protect voter rights so important in the context of elections for President and Vice-President that 
it has indicated that Congress has an implied power to safeguard the “purity of presidential and 
vice presidential elections,” Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 544–45 (1934), and the 
“the free and uncorrupted choice of those who have the right to take part in that choice,” Ex parte 
Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 662 (1884). See also Dan T. Coenen & Edward J. Larson, Congression-
al Power Over Presidential Elections: Lessons from the Past and Reforms for the Future, 43 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 851, 887–90 (2002) (developing these points in detail). All of this powerfully 
indicates that there is no basis for identifying any “Vice-President exception” to the general prin-
ciples of popular self-rule that lie at the heart of our constitutional system. 
 135 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968). 
 136 Powell, 395 U.S. at 540–41. 
 137 See supra note 73 and accompanying text (noting indications in the legislative history that 
no limit on pursuit of the vice-presidency was intended). 
 138 There is a second purpose-based argument for excluding two-prior-term Presidents from 
the vice-presidency. According to this argument, if a former two-term President can run for Vice-
President, the danger exists that a conspiracy between a sham presidential candidate and former-
President vice-presidential candidate could take hold. Under this feared scenario, the election of 
such a ticket would trigger the prompt post-election resignation of the sham President and the 
immediate replacement of that person with the otherwise unelectable former-President Vice-
President. And because such a power grab—whether pulled off with or without the previous 
knowledge of the national electorate—would violate the no-more-FDRs core aim of the Twenty-
Second Amendment, this argument posits that it is right to read the Twelfth and Twenty-Second 
Amendments as barring the election of former two-term Presidents as Vice-President. See Pea-
body & Gant, supra note 7, at 622–24 (identifying this argument). One major problem with this 
contention is that it would throw out the baby with the bathwater by installing a textually unsup-
ported, across-the-board prohibition to deal with an exceptionally extraordinary case. Assume, for 
example, a world in which Hillary Clinton is nominated for the presidency and chooses Bill Clin-
ton as her running mate. Obviously, she would not make this choice because she was pursuing the 
presidency as a sham candidate. Nor has any presidential candidate in American history contem-
plated anything of the sort. Another difficulty with the argument is that it ignores the good judg-
ment of the American people. It is farfetched to think that the nation’s voters would fail to detect a 
self-serving effort to pull a Twenty-Second-Amendment trick on them or to embrace with enthusi-
asm a presidential ticket openly designed to circumvent the Constitution’s strictures. (Moreover, if 
voters somehow chose to embrace such a ticket, it would almost surely be only because the most 
compelling circumstances confronted them—thus placing the value of voter autonomy at its very 
highest ebb.) For this reason, this argument runs up against the common-sense proposition that 
constitutional interpreters can and should consider the extent to which ordinary political processes 
will operate to fend off the worst-case scenarios that prophets of legal doom might concoct. See, 
e.g., Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 447 (1978) (declining to apply dormant 
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even if a plausible purpose-based argument for the total-ineligibility inter-
pretation did exist, it could not trump the Constitution’s governing text. 
That text indicates that who cannot “be elected to the office of President”139 
and who is “ineligible to the office of President”140 are two different things. 
Thus, the Twelfth Amendment’s vice-presidential ineligibility rule—which 
hinges specifically on presidential ineligibility, rather than presidential non-
electability—does not disqualify twice-before-elected Presidents from seek-
ing, securing, or holding the vice-presidential office. 
D. The Beside-the-Point Transition Clause 
Advocates of the view that prior two-time Presidents are ineligible for 
the vice-presidency have one last argument. They might say that the transi-
tion clause of the Twenty-Second Amendment—which appears in the sec-
ond sentence of the Amendment’s Section 1—lends support to their posi-
tion. The transition clause set forth two separate rules. The first, which was 
injected into the Amendment as part of the late-stage Taft-Tydings compro-
mise, in effect gave then-sitting President Truman a lifetime pass from the 
Amendment’s constraining effects.141 The second part of the transition 
clause goes on to state that “this Article . . . shall not prevent any person 
who may be holding the office of President, or acting as President, during 
the term within which this article becomes operative from holding the office 
of President or acting as President during the remainder of such term.”142 
Professor Amar has argued that the phrase “acting as President” in this 
clause supports the view that twice-elected Presidents cannot become Vice-
President. Noting that Vice-Presidents are the persons who ordinarily would 
serve as acting Presidents,143 he suggests that the Amendment’s framers 
would have had no reason to give a Vice-President-turned-President any 
special protection during the term of ratification (that is, “the term within 
which this article becomes operative”) unless such a person had been ren-
dered ineligible to serve as Vice-President (and thus foreclosed from suc-
                                                                                                                           
Commerce Clause where a “[s]tate’s own political processes will act as a check on local regula-
tions that unduly burden interstate commerce”). In any event, this end-run-avoiding, purpose-
based argument rests on speculative premises, and it cannot be squared with the text of the Consti-
tution, the value of free voter choice, and the evidenced intention of the Senate to protect that 
value at the final drafting stage. 
 139 U.S. CONST. amend. XXII (emphasis added). 
 140 Id. at amend. XII (emphasis added). 
 141 93 CONG. REC. 1938 (statement of Sen. Taft) (discussing the transition clause and noting 
that “it would except President Truman, in order that there may be no in personam legislation 
under the circumstances”). 
 142 U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1. 
 143 AMAR, supra note 1, at 436 n.8. 
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ceeding to the presidency) by the new Amendment’s interaction with the 
Twelfth Amendment. Professor Amar puts the point this way:  
The Twenty-Second’s retroactivity rules would seem to confirm 
this reading of the Twelfth. These rules applied not only to a past 
incumbent who might in the future be ‘elected’ president but also to 
one who might thenceforth ‘act[] as President’—paradigmatically, 
by being elected Vice-President and then moving back into the 
Oval Office via death, disability, or resignation.144 
The underlying thought is that there would be no reason to give a Vice-
President-turned-President, who had twice before been elected President, 
special dispensation to serve “the remainder” of the ratification term unless 
the operative terms of the Twelfth and Twenty-Second Amendments other-
wise foreclosed such a person from becoming Vice-President and thereby 
assuming the rights and duties of that office, as a general rule.145 
Part IV returns to this argument and demonstrates its failings. In par-
ticular, the analysis offered there shows that the most plausible interpreta-
tion of the transition clause (1) gives its reference to persons “acting as 
President” significant independent meaning and (2) achieves this result 
while focusing its effects solely on the transition period itself, thus preclud-
ing the extrapolation from it of any post-transition-period implications, in-
cluding as to future ineligibility for the vice-presidency.146  
But the deeper problem with the transition-clause-based extrapolation 
suggested by Professor Amar is that it clashes with the operative text, the 
history, and the purposes of the governing Amendments. Under his posited 
reading, after all, the Twenty-Second Amendment would operate to create a 
rule of presidential (and thus vice-presidential) ineligibility even though the 
text of that Amendment—in striking contrast to the preexisting and readily 
observable phrasings of the Twelfth Amendment and Article II, Section 1, 
Clause 5—embodied a purposeful congressional choice not to use the words 
                                                                                                                           
 144 Id. 
 145 See id. 
 146 See infra notes 211–224 and accompanying text (Part IV) (discussing alternative interpre-
tations of the transition clause that focus solely on its effect during the transition period). In addi-
tion, Parts II and III of this Article present modes of reading the Twelfth and Twenty-Second 
Amendments together in ways that do not go so far as to render former two-term Presidents whol-
ly ineligible for the vice-presidency even while according significant effects to the Twenty-Second 
Amendment’s transition clause. Even putting to one side the discussion in Part IV, there is much 
to be said for the view that these alternative reconciliations of the various constitutional clauses 
(and particularly the two-years-only-succession-right interpretation discussed in Part III, section 
B) embody better syntheses than the total-ineligibility interpretation considered and rejected in 
Part I. 
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“eligible” or “ineligible.”147 Moreover, Professor Amar’s extrapolation would 
seem to dictate the bizarre, unfair, and antidemocratic result of forcibly de-
frocking an otherwise properly elected Vice-President during the term of 
ratification if that person (1) had previously been elected President twice 
and (2) had not yet succeeded to the presidency during the transition term 
before ratification occurred.148 In any event, the simplest logic must give 
primacy to the Twenty-Second Amendment’s operative provision, rather 
than a short-fused, housekeeping transition clause even if some conflict be-
tween the two of them exists. And that is especially true when, as here, the 
transition-clause-based negative-implication-interpretation said to support 
the rule of total ineligibility was never touched on, even obliquely, at any 
time in the legislative proceedings.149 In short, the transition clause fails to 
push forward the text-defeating proposition that the Twelfth and Twenty-
Second Amendments operate together to render twice-before-elected Presi-
dents wholly ineligible to serve as Vice-President.150 
                                                                                                                           
 147 See supra notes 37–114 and accompanying text (discussing the constitutional text and 
legislative history). 
 148 This result would logically follow because the total-ineligibility interpretation posits that 
no twice-before elected President can serve as Vice-President, and the transition clause on its face 
supplies no grandfathering protection to Vice-Presidents; rather, it provides “remainder of such 
term” protection only to “any person who may be holding the office of President, or acting as 
President” during the ratification term. U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1 (emphasis added). Could it 
really be that the framers of the Twenty-Second Amendment meant to provide that an already-
sitting Vice-President (unlike a Vice-President-turned-President) would have had to abandon that 
office during the ratification term? The more plausible view is that the drafters targeted the grand-
fathering protections supplied by the transition clause only at actual and acting Presidents because 
they understood the Twelfth and Twenty-Second Amendments not to say anything about Vice-
Presidents qua Vice-Presidents at all—and, in particular, not to render someone ineligible for the 
vice-presidency based on that person’s prior service as President. 
 149 See generally infra notes 211–224 and accompanying text (Part IV) (discussing two alter-
native interpretations of the transition clause that do not requiring drawing negative implications). 
 150 One might also argue that the negative-implication approach suggested by Professor Amar 
is untenable because it would ascribe to the relevant portion of the transition clause no purpose 
except to address an entirely nonexistent problem—namely, the potential election of Herbert Hoo-
ver as Vice-President for the 1953–57 term following his earlier return to the presidency for at 
least two years during the 1949–53 term. This is the case because Section 2 of the Amendment 
specified a ratification period of seven years; because no persons other than Harry Truman and 
Herbert Hoover could possibly have ended up securing a third term (either as President or Vice-
President) during that seven-year period; and because Harry Truman was dealt with in the first 
part of the transition clause, thus rendering the second part inapplicable to him. In 1947, however, 
it would have been difficult to imagine a later application of the Twenty-Second Amendment to 
the President who had presided over the stock market collapse of 1929, the onset of the Great 
Depression, and the erection of “Hooverville” shantytowns across the United States. (Additional-
ly, if President Hoover had been elected Vice-President in 1952, he would have ended his service 
(as President or Vice-President) in 1957 at the age of eight-four—more than fifteen years beyond 
the last-term age of any prior President and eight years beyond the last-term age of any prior Vice-
President.) As later discussion will show, this nuanced Herbert-Hoover-only critique of Professor 
Amar’s position does not provide a trump card argument against his claim that a prior-two-term 
President is foreclosed from running for Vice-President. See infra note 221 (developing this point 
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II. THE ELECTORAL-INELIGIBILITY APPROACH 
The foregoing discussion shows that the Twenty-Second Amendment 
does not render twice-before-elected Presidents wholly ineligible to become 
Vice-President under the Twelfth Amendment. Some proponents of the two-
time-Presidents-cannot-run position, however, might be left unimpressed. 
The problem, they will say, is that Part I of this Article asks and answers the 
wrong question. On this view, the right rule is one under which a twice-
before-elected President is not foreclosed altogether from serving as Vice-
President. Such a person could, in particular, be appointed to that office 
pursuant to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.151 But the Constitution would 
still limit the twice-elected President’s options—in particular, by prohibiting 
that person’s election to the vice-presidency. 
In fact, there are two separate analytical pathways that could lead to this 
conclusion. The first involves (as does the broader total-ineligibility interpre-
tation) reading the Twelfth and Twenty-Second Amendments in pari materia. 
The second, in contrast, looks to the Twenty-Second Amendment standing 
alone. Neither of these routes, however, takes the proponent of the no-
electoral-eligibility interpretation to that analytical traveler’s desired destina-
tion. 
A. The Argument from the Twelfth and Twenty-Second Amendments 
The first defense of the no-electoral-eligibility position rests on the joint 
operation of the Twelfth and Twenty-Second Amendments. The argument 
goes as follows: Under the express terms of the Twenty-Second Amendment, 
a twice-before-elected President cannot again be “elected” to the presiden-
cy.152 Thus it is proper to say that such a person is “ineligible” to become 
President by way of election. And so, because the Twelfth Amendment applies 
the same eligibility rules to Presidents and Vice-Presidents,153 it should fol-
low that twice-before-elected Presidents are likewise not eligible to become 
Vice-President by way of election. 
                                                                                                                           
in detail). Even so, this critique is yet another of many strikes against the total-ineligibility inter-
pretation—thus pushing forward the need to look for an alternative interpretation that does not 
suffer from similar text-based and other difficulties. The best interpretations of the transition 
clause are set forth and defended in Part IV of this Article. 
 151 Section 2 of that Amendment provides that: “Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of 
the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon con-
firmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.” U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 2. 
 152 See supra note 8 and accompanying text (setting forth the Twenty-Second Amendment’s 
“[n]o person shall be elected” language). 
 153 See supra note 2 and accompanying text (setting forth the language of the Twelfth 
Amendment’s final sentence). 
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In contrast to the proposed rule of total ineligibility for the vice-
presidency, this alternative rule does not impede in any way the appoint-
ment of a twice-before-elected President to the vice-presidency.154 Indeed, 
that is the critical point. According to the no-electoral-eligibility interpreta-
tion, twice-before-elected Presidents are ineligible for the vice-presidency 
only in the sense that they cannot be elected to the vice-presidency, even 
though they remain eligible to be appointed to that office. 
This line of reasoning at least gives a grain of significance to the word 
“elected” as it is used in the Twenty-Second Amendment. Even so, the ar-
gument fails. To begin with, the electoral-ineligibility interpretation suffers 
from many of the same difficulties that mark the total-ineligibility interpre-
tation. For example, there is no hint of such a plan in the legislative materi-
als,155 and this approach offends the background norm of free electoral 
choice.156 Indeed, this interpretation clashes with that norm in the most pal-
pable way—that is, by favoring with access to the highest office in the land 
those who are only appointed to the vice-presidency over those who would 
otherwise take on that office through a nationwide decision made at the 
polls. In addition, the purpose-based prevention-of-unduly-long-service ar-
gument for the total-ineligibility position157—which, as previously dis-
cussed, provides at best only a vanishing measure of support for that inter-
pretive approach158—applies with equal force to the alternative electoral-
ineligibility synthesis. 
The main difficulty with this argument, however, is more fundamental. 
Once again, it stretches the text of the Twelfth Amendment beyond the 
breaking point. As we have seen, that Amendment states that “no person 
constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that 
of Vice-President.”159 There is simply no hint here of a shifting, contextual, 
two-track, mode-of-selection-based conception of eligibility. The text indi-
cates that would-be office-seekers are either “ineligible to the office of the 
President” or they are not; there is no indication that persons are half-
eligible for the office—that is, eligible by way of appointment, but not by 
way of election. What is more, this either-you-are-eligible-or-you-are-not 
                                                                                                                           
 154 In particular, this is a straightforward negative implication of the Twenty-Second Amend-
ment precisely because its operative clause states only that twice-before-elected Presidents (or 
their legal equivalent) shall not be “elected.” See U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1. 
 155 See supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing speculation about congressional 
intent). 
 156 See supra notes 129–136 and accompanying text (discussing legislative concern about 
voter freedom). In addition, any Herbert-Hoover-only attack on the total-ineligibility interpreta-
tion, see supra note 150, would apply in equal measure to the electoral-ineligibility interpretation. 
 157 See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 158 See supra notes 127–130 and accompanying text. 
 159 U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
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approach was surely on the minds of the Twelfth Amendment’s drafters and 
ratifiers. This is the case because that Amendment made obvious reference 
to the either-you-are-eligible-or-you-are-not set of qualifications (based on 
native-born citizenship, age, and residence) already set forth in Article II, 
Section 1, Clause 5.160 
The electoral-ineligibility interpretation also puts the constitutional 
text on a collision course with itself. In effect, this interpretation posits that 
the drafters of the Twenty-Second Amendment meant to add to the list of 
eligibility requirements set forth in Article II, Section 1, Clause 5. It is 
worth thinking about how, when viewed in this way, the rule of exclusion 
posited by the electoral-ineligibility approach might be phrased. The most 
logical choice would involve adding to the rules regarding citizenship, age, 
and residency an additional restriction along these lines: “and no person 
shall be eligible for the office of President if that person, having twice be-
fore been elected President, is elected to a third term.”161 Once one thinks of 
the supposedly new eligibility rule this way, however, major problems come 
into view. After all, the textually-declared point of the Twenty-Second 
Amendment is that a twice-before-elected President cannot “be elected” 
President.162 And it would be passing strange to say that someone is ineligi-
ble only “if . . . elected to a third term” when that person cannot be elected 
to a third term in the first place. All of this suggests that the electoral-
ineligibility interpretation reflects at bottom the same confusion between 
electability and eligibility that renders the broader total-ineligibility inter-
pretation a constitutional non-starter. 
The text of the Twelfth Amendment creates yet another problem for the 
electoral-ineligibility approach. This is the case because the Amendment’s 
treatment of Vice-Presidents hinges specifically, and only, on whether 
someone is “eligible to the office of President.”163 On its face, this language 
                                                                                                                           
 160 See supra text accompanying note 6 (quoting this provision). Notably, the electoral-
ineligibility interpretation both (1) purports to be based on the Twelfth and Twenty-Second 
Amendments and (2) simultaneously rests on a sharp distinction between the election and the 
appointment of Vice-Presidents. However, no constitutional text that provided for the appointment 
of Vice-Presidents existed at the time the Twelfth Amendment was adopted or, indeed, until a 
decade and a half after the Twenty-Second Amendment came into being. See U.S. CONST. amend. 
XXV (providing, in the first instance, for presidential appointments of Vice-Presidents to fill va-
cancies in that office). 
 161 The reference to being “elected to a third term” is a critical element of this posited provi-
sion because it would be inconsistent with the electoral-ineligibility theory itself to say, without 
more, that a person is ineligible for the presidency simply because of being “twice before . . . 
elected President.” After all, the whole point of the electoral-ineligibility theory is that, regardless 
of two earlier elections to the presidency, a person remains eligible to be President (that is, via 
succession) so long as that person is not “elected to a third term.” 
 162 See U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 163 See id. (emphasis added). 
1320 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:1287 
cuts against drawing any distinction between the purportedly separate sub-
jects of eligibility for election and eligibility for appointment. Rather, it 
straightforwardly indicates that the clause envisions a single set of qualifi-
cations that address eligibility “to the office” itself, regardless of how “the 
office” might be obtained. In this regard, the Twenty-Second Amendment 
joins other constitutional provisions in making clear that, even though a 
twice-before-elected President cannot again “be elected” to that office, such 
a person is fully able to succeed to that office from (for example) that per-
son’s position as Speaker of the House or Secretary of State.164 Given these 
circumstances, there is no easy linguistic way to conclude that a twice-
before-elected President is not “eligible to the office of the President.” Such 
a person is eligible to that office, but simply cannot come to hold it by way 
of election. Put another way, being “eligible to the office” (which language 
does appear in the Twelfth Amendment) is not at all the same thing as being 
“eligible for election” (which language does not appear in the Twelfth 
Amendment).165 Indeed, Section 3 of the Twentieth Amendment seems to 
drive this point home because it suggests there are instances in which a per-
son might be elected to the presidency (so that the person is “eligible for 
election”), even though that person does not “qualify” to serve in that office 
(and thus is not “eligible to the office” until more time passes).166 
The bottom line is that being “ineligible to the office of the Presi-
dent”—and thus to “that of Vice-President”—is not a quality that depends 
on how one assumes the office. To be sure, the drafters of the relevant pro-
visions of the Constitution could have opted for such a rule. But in neither 
the Twelfth nor the Twenty-Second Amendment did they make this choice. 
                                                                                                                           
 164 See supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing the line of succession to the presi-
dency); see also Peabody & Gant, supra note 7, at 612–13. 
 165 See U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 166 See id. at amend. XX, § 3 (providing that “if the President elect shall have failed to qualify 
then the Vice President elect shall act as President until a President shall have qualified”). Reflect-
ing on this provision, Chief Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit recently noted in Lindsay v. Bow-
en that an elected President’s “ineligibility may be discerned after the election,” thus requiring a 
“temporary succession to the Presidency by the Vice President” for the period—to use the 
Amendment’s terms—“until a President shall have qualified.” 750 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 
2014). One point seems to be that a President who is not yet thirty-five years old or not yet a U.S. 
resident for fourteen years can be legally elected President, even though he or she is not yet eligi-
ble to serve in that office. That conclusion cuts sharply against the idea that whether one is “eligi-
ble to the office of the President” depends on whether one is electable to that office. See also JO-
SEPH STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 1472–73 
(1833) (calling the requirement that the President be thirty-five years old a “qualification of age” 
and discussing when being abroad for too long could “amount to a disqualification” under Article 
II’s residency requirements). 
2015] Two-Time Presidents and the Vice Presidency 1321 
B. The Single-Clause Alternative 
The preceding discussion shows why the Twelfth and Twenty-Second 
Amendments do not operate together to render twice-chosen Presidents 
unelectable, but still appointable, to the vice-presidency. There might, how-
ever, be an alternative analytical route to that same result, and Judge Rich-
ard Posner has made the effort to map one. He contends that the Twenty-
Second Amendment, wholly apart from the Twelfth, might well block the 
selection by election, but only by election, of would-be Vice-Presidents 
whom the electorate twice before has chosen to serve as President. His ar-
gument relies entirely on the opening words of the Twenty-Second 
Amendment: “No person shall be elected to the office of the President more 
than twice.”167 According to Judge Posner: “[O]ne could argue that since 
the Vice-President is elected, . . . should he take office [as President,] he 
would be in effect elected president. Electing a Vice-President means elect-
ing a Vice-President and contingently electing him as president.”168 In other 
words, if Americans were to elect a twice-before-elected President as Vice-
President, that person would also be “elected to the office of the President” 
within the meaning of the Twenty-Second Amendment, even if only on a 
conditional basis; thus, the Twenty-Second Amendment standing alone bars 
a two-term President’s election as Vice-President because its core directive 
is that “no person” may be “elected to the office of the President more than 
twice.” 
This argument, although imaginative, is not persuasive for several rea-
sons.169 The first reason is that it departs from normal usage of the English 
language to say that someone is “elected to the office of the President” 
when that person is elected only to the office of Vice-President at the time 
that voters actually cast their ballots. In addition, if election to the vice-
presidency in and of itself qualifies as being “elected to the office of the 
President” (even if only conditionally), then the Twenty-Second Amend-
ment would seem to bar a twice-before-elected Vice-President from running 
for the presidency. But no one has ever seriously suggested that persons 
such as Richard Nixon, George H. W. Bush, or Al Gore—each of whom had 
twice before served in the vice-presidency—acted illegally when they ran 
for President. 
Judge Posner recognizes this complication and seeks to sidestep it by 
making clear that one is “elected to the office of President” by being elected 
Vice-President only if that person later succeeds to the presidency; other-
wise, he suggests, an “election to the office of the President,” even of a 
                                                                                                                           
 167 U.S. CONST. amend. XXII. 
 168 Baker, supra note 1 (quoting an email from Judge Posner). 
 169 Indeed, Judge Posner himself acknowledged that the contention is “a little bold.” Id. 
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conditional nature, has not yet occurred.170 But this argument creates anoth-
er serious difficulty. After all, if a two-term President were elected Vice-
President, that person might refuse to succeed to the presidential office and 
thus—on Judge Posner’s own reasoning—not be conditionally elected as 
President. Indeed, even a present-day or previous President, such as George 
W. Bush or Bill Clinton, might establish well before election day that his 
selection as Vice-President would not be a conditional election to the presi-
dency by solemnly pledging that he would never succeed to the presidency 
if the chance to do so arose. Put another way, Judge Posner’s conditional-
election view of the Twenty-Second Amendment might be seen as logically 
dictating only that a twice-before-elected President cannot again assume the 
nation’s highest office from the vice-presidency. But the question of wheth-
er someone can succeed to the presidency is different from the question of 
whether someone can be elected to and serve in the office of Vice-
President.171 
Clever analysts might come up with plausible responses to these cri-
tiques.172 But even if these critiques were to fall by the wayside, there re-
mains a problem with Judge Posner’s interpretive approach that seems in-
superable: His interpretation of the Twenty-Second Amendment contra-
venes its own controlling text. That Amendment, after all, states that “no 
person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more 
than two years of a term to which some other person was elected President 
shall be elected to the office of the President more than once.”173 Indeed, this 
language appears in the very same sentence of the Twenty-Second Amend-
ment that alone gives rise to Judge Posner’s contention. On its face, however, 
this language indicates that “some other person was elected President” in 
those instances when the Vice-President takes over as President. And so this 
language pushes hard against the claim that a Vice-President-turned-President 
is “elected to the office of President”—whether conditionally or uncondition-
ally—for purposes of the Twenty-Second Amendment. 
The other textual difficulty raised by Judge Posner’s interpretation is 
equally serious. The essential step of his argument is to assert that a person 
is “elected to the office of the President” for purposes of the Twenty-Second 
Amendment—conditionally elected, to be sure, but elected nonetheless—if 
that person is initially elected as Vice-President and thereafter succeeds to the 
                                                                                                                           
 170 Id.  
 171 See infra notes 177–190 and accompanying text (Part III, section A). 
 172 One might argue, for example, that a Vice-President cannot opt out of succeeding to the 
presidency under Article II, Section 1. (For the text of the provision, see infra note 183 and ac-
companying text.) On this view, a sitting Vice-President automatically succeeds to the presidential 
office, even if that Vice-President refuses to serve or to take the presidential oath. 
 173 U.S. CONST. amend. XXII (emphasis added). 
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presidency. That assertion, however, cannot be reconciled with the Amend-
ment’s express treatment of persons who previously served part of a presiden-
tial term. Assume, for example, that Vice-President Samuel Smurfoid must 
take over the presidency for the final ninety days of the 2021–25 term. It 
would follow, according to Judge Posner’s extrapolation, that Smurfoid was 
conditionally elected President for that term because he was elected Vice-
President and then moved from that office to the presidency. And so, ac-
cording to the logic of Judge Posner, Smurfoid could thereafter be elected 
President for only one additional term because the Twenty-Second Amend-
ment commands that “[n]o person shall be elected to the office of the Presi-
dent more than twice.”174 The Twenty-Second Amendment itself, however, 
precludes this outcome. This is so because the ensuing language of the 
Amendment states that Smurfoid can be elected President two more times 
because his initial stint in the Oval Office was not “for more than two years 
of a term.”175 
The bottom line is that Judge Posner’s proposed reading of the Twenty-
Second Amendment contravenes the text of the very Amendment on which he 
exclusively relies. Nothing in the Amendment indicates that someone who 
succeeds from the vice-presidency to the presidency is “elected to the office 
of the President.”176 To the contrary, the Amendment itself makes it clear that 
such a person is not elected to the office of the President, but instead is elect-
ed to the office of the Vice-President, just as common usage would suggest. 
III. POTENTIAL LIMITS ON VICE-PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION RIGHTS 
Parts I and II of this Article show that the Twelfth and Twenty-Second 
Amendments do not exclude twice-elected Presidents from either appoint-
ment or election to the vice-presidential office. But perhaps ratification of 
the Twenty-Second Amendment had some other limiting effect on how the 
vice-presidency works. This Part considers that subject. Section A explores 
the possibility that the Twenty-Second Amendment blocks longtime Presi-
dents who become Vice-President from moving into the presidency from the 
vice-presidential office. Section B addresses another possibility—namely, 
that such a Vice-President might be able to succeed to the presidency but 
not thereafter serve in that office for more than two years. These interpre-
tive options—especially the second one—have more going for them than a 
first glance might suggest. In the end, however, neither stands up to close 
scrutiny. 
                                                                                                                           
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. 
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A. The No-Succession Interpretation 
At the outset of this Article, an important conceptual distinction was 
introduced—namely, the distinction between whether a twice-elected Presi-
dent can be chosen to serve as Vice-President and whether a twice-elected 
President who is chosen for the vice-presidency can succeed from that of-
fice to the presidency. This distinction had received little attention in the 
post-Twenty-Second-Amendment world. In 1960, however, it bubbled up to 
the surface. There was talk at the time that President Eisenhower—who was 
then winding up his second full term—might sign on as the running mate 
for the Republican Party’s soon-to-be-named presidential nominee, Richard 
Nixon.177 Exactly what President Eisenhower’s close advisors had to say on 
this subject has been lost in the mists of time. But one report indicates that 
then-Attorney General William Rogers counseled Eisenhower that, although 
the Twenty-Second Amendment would not block his election as Vice-
President, it would preclude him from moving into the presidency from that 
office.178 
Does this succession-right-limiting interpretation of the relevant con-
stitutional provisions make sense? The argument that it does would seem to 
stem from the second portion of the Twenty-Second Amendment’s transi-
tion clause. That text, as we have seen, does not focus on whether someone 
can be elected (or otherwise selected) to be Vice-President.179 Rather, it ad-
dresses whether someone who has been placed in that office can continue to 
“hold[] the office of President or act[] as President” for “the remainder” of 
the transition period term.180 Perhaps this language signals a background 
assumption that has nothing to do with eligibility for the vice-presidency.181 
Rather, the assumption might be one that centers on presidential service—
that is, one that addresses, as does the transition clause itself, the subject of 
                                                                                                                           
 177 See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing Eisenhower rumors); see also Vote 
for Eisenhower: Delegate Says He’ll Propose Him for Vice-Presidency, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 
1960, at 8 (reporting on Representative James Fulton’s expressed intention to nominate Eisen-
hower as Vice-President at the Republication National Convention). Peabody and Gant speculate 
that, even though Eisenhower may have raised the possibility in jest, reported discussions within 
an “inner circle” suggest that he may have considered this option at some point in a serious way. 
Peabody & Gant, supra note 7, at 604 n.183. 
 178 Nixon and Eisenhower? Well, G.O.P. Can Hope, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1960, at 26. Not-
withstanding the report to this effect in 1960, the former Attorney General indicated that he in fact 
never offered any such advice to President Eisenhower at the time. Peabody & Gant, supra note 7, 
at 604–05 n.185 (quoting Letter from William P. Rogers, Former U.S. Attorney Gen., to Theresa 
Ferrero (Nov. 12, 1997) (on file with Scott Gant)). 
 179 See supra note 33 and accompanying text (quoting text of the Twenty-Second Amend-
ment). 
 180 U.S. CONT. amend. XXII. 
 181 See supra notes 141–150 and accompanying text (discussing rationale for Professor Am-
ar’s view that a prior two-time President is ineligible for the vice-presidency). 
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“holding,” or “acting” in, the presidential office for “the remainder of such 
term.” Moving from this starting point, a defender of the position attributed 
to Attorney General Rogers might say that the most logical conclusion is 
this: By specifying that a Vice-President, who twice before had been elected 
President, could serve as President during “the remainder” of the term in 
which ratification occurred, the transition clause indicates by negative im-
plication that such a Vice-President cannot thus serve as President during 
“the remainder” of any later, post-ratification term. In other words, putting 
to one side the specialized one-shot rules that govern the transition term 
itself, a twice-before-elected President can become Vice-President but can-
not succeed from that office to the presidency.182 
One difficulty with this interpretation is that it creates significant ten-
sion with Article II, Section 1, Clause 6, which specifies that “[i]n Case of 
the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or 
Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same 
shall devolve on the Vice-President.”183 This clause, however, does not say 
that an elected Vice-President will always take over the presidential office 
in the event that it becomes vacant. Indeed, Clause 6 goes on to vest Congress 
with authority to establish a line of succession in “the case of Removal, 
Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice-President.”184 
And even if the framers envisioned the automatic ascension to the presidency 
by any Vice-President who did not possess an “inability” in the limited 
sense of a service-precluding physical or mental impairment, a later-
adopted constitutional provision—here, the Twenty-Second Amendment—
could go further in precluding succession by the Vice-President in addition-
al cases.185 
Thus the question is squarely posed: Does the Twenty-Second 
Amendment signal that a twice-before-elected President could be elected to 
the vice-presidency but then not be able to succeed from that office to the 
presidency? There are reasons of policy to conclude that it does not. To 
begin with, the idea of a Vice-President who cannot take over the presiden-
cy in the event of a vacancy in that office departs from conventional under-
                                                                                                                           
 182 It might also be said that this interpretation jibes with the root purpose of the Twenty-
Second Amendment. Under this interpretation, so the argument goes, no one can get the sort of 
FDR-like long run in the presidency that lay at the heart of the Eightieth Congress’s concerns. At 
the same time, claimed rights of free voter choice in filling the vice-presidency remain fully pro-
tected. See supra notes 60–86, 112–114, 131–137 and accompanying text (discussing principles 
underlying the Twenty-Second Amendment). 
 183 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (emphasis added). 
 184 Id. (emphasis added). 
 185 See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 454–55 (1976) (finding that later-ratified 
Fourteenth Amendment effectuated a “carv[ing] out” of state sovereign immunity protections put 
in place by the earlier-ratified Eleventh Amendment). 
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standing of the role of the Vice-President. Such a result, after all, would cre-
ate the peculiar outcome that a person who was never elected to a national 
office (for example, the Secretary of State) could leapfrog a Vice-President, 
chosen by the national electorate, from lower in the line of succession to fill 
the presidential office.186 Such a regime could also breed practical prob-
lems, in part because the prospect of this result could bring about destabiliz-
ing uncertainty and political gamesmanship as to what person might come 
to occupy the highest office in the land.187 All of this, many observers will 
say, is not what the drafters of the Twenty-Second Amendment, or any other 
sensible persons, could have had in mind. And that is especially true be-
cause there exist contrary signals in the Amendment’s legislative history.188 
All of these critiques of the no-succession-right interpretation carry 
weight. But the biggest problem of all lies, once again, in the constitutional 
text. The difficulty is that even the most nimble interpreter of the Twenty-
Second Amendment will struggle in vain to find any language in that provi-
sion’s operative terms to which to hitch the wagon of this argument. There 
are simply no words in the Amendment’s first, limitation-creating sentence 
that offer a basis for claiming that a properly selected Vice-President cannot 
succeed from that office to the presidency,189 and there certainly are no 
words that purport to identify a new form of “inability” to succeed to the 
presidential office within the meaning of Article II, Section 1, Clause 6.190 
The critical point is that the first sentence of Section 1 of the Twenty-
Second Amendment—which sets forth in full the operative rule of that 
Amendment—contains no text from which this limitation can be derived.191 
And the transition clause—precisely because it is only a transition clause—
cannot on its own create freestanding substantive rules. That, however, is 
exactly the way in which the argument for the no-succession-right interpre-
tation works. In effect, it seeks to extract from the transition clause, and 
                                                                                                                           
 186 See supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing line of succession to the presidency). 
 187 Peabody and Gant offer the added observation that, in such circumstances, the succession 
of a Vice-President who was twice-elected President might well have a salutary stabilizing effect 
during what could be a period of crisis. See Peabody & Gant, supra note 7, at 634. 
 188 Notably, the Senate Judiciary Committee’s draft of the Amendment specified that “[a] 
person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, on 365 calendar days or more in 
each of two terms shall not be eligible to hold the Office of President or to act as President for 
any part of another term.” 93 CONG REC. 1680 (emphasis added). Notably, the final eleven words 
of this version of the Amendment directly limited the ability of persons (wherever they might 
stand in the chain of succession) to succeed to the duties of the presidency. All such language 
about the possibility of succession, however, was removed from the final version of the Amend-
ment that was approved by Congress. And precisely because the substantive terms of the final 
Amendment—in contrast to its immediate predecessor draft—did not purport to limit succession 
rights, there is reason to conclude that no such limit on succession rights was imposed. 
 189 See supra text accompanying note 33 (providing the relevant text), 
 190 Compare U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6, with id. at amend. XXII. 
 191 Id. at art. II, § 1, cl. 6. 
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from nothing else, a new exception to the generally stated rule of vice-
presidential succession rights established in Article II. 
In sum, the no-succession-right argument has no basis in the constitu-
tional text unless one draws a negative implication from the “remainder of 
such term” language that appears in the transition clause of the Twenty-
Second Amendment. But transition clauses themselves do not establish opera-
tive rules. Rather, they merely clarify the effect of otherwise-established op-
erative rules during the transition period. For this reason, the no-succession-
right argument does not carry water. There is simply no support for it in any 
operative provision of the Constitution. 
B. The Two-Years-Only-Succession-Right Interpretation 
Take a trip into the future to consider this hypothetical case. Priscilla 
Populopolous was elected President in both 2020 and 2024. Then, in 2028, 
she was elected Vice-President, but shortly thereafter the President-elect 
with whom she had run tragically passed away. As Parts I and II of this Ar-
ticle show, a vigorous debate exists about whether someone like Popu-
lopolous is eligible to serve as Vice-President.192 And this uncertainty surely 
would have complicated any effort to nominate Populopolous for the vice-
presidency and then to elect her to that office. 
So how could it be that Populopolous was elected Vice-President in 
2028? She secured that office because, in the run-up to the election, the Su-
preme Court issued a ruling—relying heavily on this Article—that rejected 
the idea that twice-before-elected Presidents are ineligible for the vice-
presidency, either in general or by way of election.193 In addition, the Court 
rejected the idea that Populopolous could not succeed from that office to the 
presidency, reasoning that there was no support in the operative terms of the 
Constitution for any such limitation.194 The Court, however, embraced an 
alternative succession-limiting interpretation of the Twenty-Second 
Amendment that startled many constitutional scholars. It declared that, if 
Populopolous did succeed to the presidency, she could serve in that office 
for no more than two years.195 
                                                                                                                           
 192 See supra notes 31–150 and accompanying text (Part I), 151–176 and accompanying text 
(Part II). 
 193 Not surprisingly, the Court’s core reasoning was that Populopolous remained “eligible” to 
the office of Vice-President under the Twelfth Amendment despite her two earlier stints as Presi-
dent, even though she could not again be “elected to the office of President,” as opposed to Vice-
President, under the Twenty-Second Amendment. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text 
(laying out eligibility and electability language). 
 194 See supra notes 177–190 and accompanying text (discussing this issue). 
 195 See Albert, supra note 1, at 564–65 (noting the possibility of this interpretation). 
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This approach, according to the Court, best captured the meaning of all 
the relevant constitutional clauses. To begin with, the Court explained, this 
interpretation jibed with the operative first sentence of the Twenty-Second 
Amendment on the theory that it indicates that “[n]o person” can serve “for 
more than two years” if “elected to the office of the President more than 
once.”196 The Court also emphasized that this reading of the Amendment fit 
together well with those portions of the legislative history that suggested a 
congressional design to ensure that no person—at least within three terms—
would serve as President for more than ten years.197 
Finally, the Court relied on the transition clause. It reasoned that the 
no-eligibility, the no-electoral-eligibility, and the no-succession-right inter-
pretive approaches all embodied unjustifiably strained efforts to derive a 
negative implication from that provision. The Court, however, viewed the 
two-years-only-succession-right interpretation as both linguistically plausi-
ble and uninfected by the maladies that afflicted each of those three alterna-
tive approaches. It reasoned that if Populopolous, after twice before having 
been elected President, had become a successor President during the term in 
which the Twenty-Second Amendment was ratified, the language of the 
transition clause would have ensured that she could have served out the full 
“remainder of such term.”198 But Populopolous was elected Vice-President 
in 2028, so the transition clause afforded her no similar “remainder of such 
term” protection. Thus, the Court concluded that Populopolous could not 
serve out the “remainder of [the] term” that began in 2029; instead, during 
that post-ratification term, she could serve for only two years. 
This interpretation took many legal scholars by surprise. Indeed, re-
cently appointed Justice Donovan Disputer penned a stinging dissent that 
accused the majority of “rearranging the words of the Twenty-Second 
Amendment in a self-servingly wild and free-style way.”199 Justice Disputer 
                                                                                                                           
 196 The relevant portion of the clause, with the relevant words emphasized, is as follows: 
“[N]o person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two years 
of a term to which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of the 
President more than once.” U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 197 In particular, as discussed earlier, there are some indications that Senator Taft and others 
anticipated that the finalized version of the Amendment would stop any one person from serving 
as President for more than ten years. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (discussing this 
point). In keeping with this notion, if Populopolous had succeeded to the presidency from the 
vice-presidency for two years during the 2017–21 term, she could still have been elected President 
in both 2020 and 2024—thus occupying the presidency for ten years. By symmetry of logic (so 
the Court reasoned in Populopolous’s case), she should likewise get ten years in the presidency—
but not more than ten years—when the term of succession postdated service in the presidential 
office. And that is exactly the result that the two-years-only-succession-right interpretation pro-
duces. 
 198 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXII. 
 199 This “quoted” language from Justice Disputer’s “dissent” is simply make-believe, of 
course. 
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emphasized that the Amendment’s treatment of part-term service in the 
presidency for more than two years is built around use of the past tense; in 
particular, the clause states that “no person who has held the office of Presi-
dent, or acted as President, for more than two years of a term to which 
some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of 
President more than once.”200 This phrasing, Justice Disputer insisted, indi-
cated that “shall be elected” means “shall thereafter be elected.” “The ma-
jority,” he urged, “seeks to transmute a limit on service triggered by a 
backward-looking condition that applies when someone already ‘has held 
office’ for two years into a new, forward-looking two-year limit on future 
service that the text in no way supports.” “This move,” Justice Disputer 
concluded, “qualifies as Presto-Chango magic no less marvelous than Harry 
Potter’s finest work. But it also perverts the function of those who wear ju-
dicial robes in a way that is downright Voldemortian.”201 
This critique of the two-years-only-succession-right interpretation 
packs a serious punch. But our hypothetical Supreme Court majority at least 
purported to rely on the operative words of the Twenty-Second Amendment. 
It might be said in this regard that the Court read the Amendment’s critical 
language—“shall be elected”—in a permissible way to mean “shall be 
elected, either in the past or the future.” In addition, the majority made a 
fair point in suggesting that its interpretation finds some support in the 
Amendment’s legislative history.202 In short, because Priscilla Populopolous 
had been “elected to the office of the President more than once,” she could 
not thereafter be put in a position whereby she “held the office of President, 
or acted as President, for more than two years.” And so, Populopolous 
would have to step down from the presidency after two years of service dur-
                                                                                                                           
 200 U.S. CONST. amend. XXII (emphasis added). 
 201 In a lengthy textual footnote, Justice Disputer went on to note that references to the two-
year-rule in the legislative discussions reflected a clear understanding that it would work this way. 
By way of example, the Justice explained, Senator Taft indicated that the Amendment’s treatment 
of service by a Vice-President-turned-President concerned the “first term” and thus dictated that 
“if he has held office less than two years, he may be reelected twice.” See 93 CONG. REC. 1956 
(emphasis added). 
 202 In addition to producing an alignment with the ten-year-limit conception of the Amend-
ment, this interpretation gains some support from the sequence of drafting. This is the case be-
cause the version of the Amendment initially considered by the House specifically used the term 
“shall thereafter be ineligible,” but the term “thereafter” was dropped in the drafting process, and 
does not appear in the final version of the Amendment. See 93 CONG. REC. 863 (emphasis added); 
see also U.S. CONST. amend. XXII. In effect expressing the same idea as the version put before 
the House, the initial incarnation of H.R. 27 likewise prohibited any future form of presidential 
service if the would-be candidate had “theretofore served as President during the whole or part of 
each of any two separate terms.” See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text (setting forth 
these earlier drafts). The omission of such phraseology from the final Amendment gives some 
support to the idea that, contrary to Justice Disputer’s hypothetical dissent, the term “no person 
shall be elected” does not mean “no person shall thereafter be elected.” 
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ing the 2029–33 term. Then her own Vice-President, appointed and con-
firmed in Gerald Ford-like fashion pursuant to the Twenty-Fifth Amend-
ment, would move into the Oval Office.203 
The preceding discussion suggests that the two-years-only-succession-
right interpretation of the Twenty-Second Amendment has more plausibility 
than first impressions might suggest. Even so, this interpretation carries 
with it a troublesome wrinkle that does not mark the alternatives: the total-
ineligibility, the electoral-ineligibility, and the no-successor-right approach-
es. The wrinkle is that this interpretation could compel a successor Presi-
dent to step down in the middle of a four-year term—indeed, in the middle 
of a four-year term during which one hand-off of the presidency had already 
occurred—thus thrusting a third President into a single, four-year period of 
service.204 Critics are sure to say that this result is so odd, so disruptive of 
government operations, and so fraught with peril for the nation that the 
framers of the Twenty-Second Amendment could not have envisioned it. 
This practical concern may have a role to play in the decisional calcu-
lus. But it does not rise to the level of an interpretive deal-breaker. In part 
this is the case because it is not likely that real-world conditions would 
come together in a way that would produce the troubling result.205 Moreo-
ver, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment now provides helpful guidance as to the 
nature of succession rights when such a one-term three-step shift in the 
presidency must occur. Critics of the two-years-only-succession-right inter-
pretation might respond that the dangers it raises are so grave that the law 
must be read to foreclose any risk that they might arise even if the odds of 
their doing so are small. But a rejoinder to this argument builds on the idea 
that the danger of such a mid-term presidential power transfer will arise 
only if the voters themselves decide that the risk is worth running.206 Voters 
often choose to take chances, including the chance that a candidate will not 
remain in office for the full duration of the electoral term.207 And that is as it 
                                                                                                                           
 203 See supra note 151 and accompanying text (discussing the Twenty-Fifth Amendment). 
 204 The earlier hand-off would result from the initial succession of the Vice-President to the 
presidency. The latter hand-off would occur when the Vice-President-turned-President would have 
to step down after the passage of two years. 
 205 The full mix of necessary conditions would be: (1) the continued involvement in politics 
of someone who has already been twice elected President or who was elected once and served at 
least two years of another term by way of succession to the office; (2) that person’s subsequent 
election as Vice-President; (3) that person’s succession to the presidency from the vice-
presidency; and (4) the occurrence of that succession prior to the expiration of two years of the 
relevant presidential term. 
 206 See supra notes 131–137 and accompanying text (discussing centrality of free voter 
choice). 
 207 The nation’s voters, for example, reelected President Roosevelt in 1944 even though there 
was reason to believe that his health was flagging. See Death of the President, MILLER CTR., 
http://millercenter.org/president/fdroosevelt/essays/biography/6 [http://perma.cc/9LFV-AJAX]. They 
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should be in a system that eschews paternalistic tinkering with free voter 
choice.208 Put simply, if voters know that an election of a former President 
as Vice-President might later require a post-succession presidential power-
transfer—but they elect that former President as Vice-President anyway—it 
is hard to say that something is amiss with our system of republican self-
government. 
Notwithstanding the preceding analysis, the two-years-only-succ ession- 
right interpretation is not sound. As for the language of the Constitution, the 
past-tense-centered critique put forward in the hypothesized opinion of Jus-
tice Disputer is strong, if not irrefutable.209 As for conventional understand-
ings, the idea of a mandatory mid-term step-down by a President who has 
already rightly succeeded to that office would seem far removed from the 
expectations of most citizens. As for policy, the prospect of a one-term mer-
ry-go-round of three or more Presidents is problematic on its face. But most 
importantly, the posited analysis of the Supreme Court of 2028 went down 
the wrong track insofar as it focused on a perceived need to draw a negative 
implication from the transition clause’s “remainder of that term” language. 
It may well be that the two-years-only-succession-right extrapolation is the 
most appealing from among the negative-implication-supported interpreta-
tions we have encountered so far—far better, in particular, than the eligibil-
ity-squelching interpretations considered in Parts I and II of this Article. As 
the next Part shows, however, there is a sound and entirely sensible way to 
interpret the transition clause that causes it to operate only with respect to 
the transition period itself.210 And because this approach reflects the most 
plausible interpretation of that clause, interpreters need not and should not 
strain to read it to give rise to any post-ratification-term negative implica-
tions at all. 
IV. THE TRANSITION-CENTERED OPERATION OF THE TRANSITION CLAUSE 
The preceding discussion identifies four possible substantive limits—
the total-ineligibility limit, the electoral-ineligibility limit, the no-
succession-right limit, and the two-year-only-succession-right limit—that 
                                                                                                                           
also voted in 1972 for President Nixon despite preexisting concerns about the White House’s in-
volvement in the Watergate break-in. See Carl Bernstein & Bob Woodward, FBI Finds Nixon Aide 
Sabotaged Democrats, WASH. POST (Oct. 10, 1972), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/
national/longterm/watergate/articles/101072-1.htm [http://perma.cc/7YUE-K4CE]. 
 208 See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text (discussing legislative preference for free 
voter choice). 
 209 See Albert, supra note 1, at 564–65 (rejecting two-years-only-succession-right approach 
because service for more than two years is relevant only in determining “the possibility of a sub-
sequent election to the presidency”) (emphasis added). 
 210 See infra notes 212–224 and accompanying text (Part IV). 
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the Twelfth and Twenty-Second Amendments might impose with regard to 
the vice-presidency in forever-operative fashion. Parts I, II, and III show 
that none of these interpretative approaches should prevail because the rele-
vant constitutional texts establish no such substantive limits with regard to 
the vice-presidency.211 A critic of this position—such as Professor Amar—
might well respond that this view of things effectively reads key language 
of the transition clause out of the Constitution. That clause, after all, states 
that the Amendment “shall not prevent any person who may be holding the 
office of President, or acting as President, during the term within which this 
Article becomes operative from holding the office of President or acting as 
President during the remainder of such term.”212 If the Twenty-Second 
Amendment created no new limits as to either vice-presidential eligibility or 
succession rights, so the argument from the transition clause goes, there 
would have been no reason to give any special transition-term protection to 
any “acting . . . President”—that is, to any Vice-President-turned-President. 
Put another way, the no-limits-at-all-on-Vice-Presidents interpretation of the 
Twelfth and Twenty-Second Amendments renders the special, sheltering 
treatment of a Vice-President-turned-Presidents in the transition clause 
“mere surplusage,” in violation of interpretive principles that reach back at 
least as far as Marbury v. Madison.213 
What is the answer to this mere surplusage critique? The answer is that 
the transition clause—in particular, its allusion to an acting President—is 
susceptible to an interpretation that accords that clause significant meaning 
solely with regard to the operation of the transition period itself. And as a 
result, the terms of the transition clause create no need to derive from it by 
negative implication some otherwise-unstated, textually-untenable, and 
still-ongoing post-ratification-period limit on vice-presidential service. In-
deed, the transition clause is subject to either of two separate interpretations 
that focus its effects squarely on the transition period itself. The first of 
those interpretations—that is, the “no-future-prejudice interpretation”—posits 
that the effect of the clause was to exempt any presidential service that oc-
curred during the ratification term from counting toward the two-term limit 
on future runs for the presidency. The second and even more plausible in-
terpretation—that is, the “clarity-for-all-past-Presidents interpretation”—
posits that the clause spelled out precisely how all past holders of the presi-
                                                                                                                           
 211 See supra notes 31–150 and accompanying text (Part I), 151–176 and accompanying text 
(Part II), 177–209 and accompanying text (Part III). 
 212 U.S. CONST. amend. XXII (emphasis added). 
 213 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (rejecting interpretation of Article 
III that would permit Congress to vest original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court because it would 
render the express allocation of original and appellate jurisdiction “mere surplusage” and “entirely 
without meaning”). 
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dential office would be treated during the transition period, with regard to 
both the reach and the limits of the transitional protections they would re-
ceive.  
The key point is that each of these readings of the transition clause is 
far more plausible than any of the four text-distorting interpretations con-
sidered in Parts I through III. In addition, because both the no-future-
prejudice interpretation and the clarity-for-all-past-Presidents interpretation 
accord all of the transition clause’s terms independent meaning, they un-
dermine any mere-surplusage argument said to support either the total-
ineligibility, the electoral-ineligibility, the no-succession-right, or the two-
years-only-succession-right interpretive approaches. The preceding analysis 
establishes that none of those interpretations reflects a sound synthesis of 
the operative texts of the Twelfth and Twenty-Second Amendments. And the 
analysis that follows confirms that conclusion by revealing that there is no 
reason whatsoever to embrace any one of those problematic syntheses based 
on the supposedly implicit commands of the Twenty-Second Amendment’s 
transition clause. 
A. The No-Future-Prejudice Interpretation 
What was the aim of the Twenty-Second Amendment’s transition clause? 
On one view, an important purpose of the clause was to protect anyone who 
succeeded to the presidency during the ratification term from suffering a near-
term future disadvantage based on that period of service. The focal point of 
this argument is the “shall not prevent” language of the transition clause, 
which might be read to mean something like “shall not stand in the way 
of.”214 On this view, the transition clause operated to permit any Vice-
President-turned-President to serve—rather than “prevent” that person from 
serving—for the full “remainder of [the transition] term” in a specialized 
sense. In particular, such ratification-term service would not compromise that 
person’s ability to secure election to the presidency twice more thereafter, 
even if the “remainder of such term” service turned out to last more than two 
years. 
This view of the transition clause is subject to challenge. Skeptics might 
say, for example, that it would have been easy for the drafters of the Twenty-
Second Amendment to choose different words for the clause if they meant for 
it to embody this no-future-prejudice meaning. But spelling out this meaning, 
in terms well-suited for an economically phrased constitutional amendment 
(and, indeed, only a transition clause in that amendment), may not have been 
easy at all. The naysayers might add this point: If the drafters had meant for 
                                                                                                                           
 214 Prevent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “prevent” as “[t]o stop 
from happening; hinder or impede”). 
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the relevant clause to support this no-future-prejudice approach, they at least 
would have substituted a less ambiguous word for the verb “prevent,” such as 
“hinder” or “impede.”215 This argument may prove too much, however, be-
cause the drafters no less easily could have substituted another term for the 
verb “prevent”—such as “prohibit” or “proscribe”—to lock down any intent 
to reject the no-future-prejudice interpretation.216 
No matter what one might say about these matters, the no-future-
prejudice interpretation gives independent meaning to the “acting . . . Presi-
dent” language of the transition clause without raising any of the serious 
textual problems engendered by the four substantive limits considered in 
Parts I through III. In any event, that interpretation does not stand alone. 
This is the case because, even if the transition clause is read not to look to 
the future at all, its reference to the “acting . . . President” performed an im-
portant function that negates any effort to cast it as mere surplusage. 
B. The Clarity-for-All-Past-Presidents Interpretation 
This second way of viewing the transition clause focuses its effect 
wholly on the transition term itself. On this view, all of the would-be inter-
pretations considered in Parts I through III, to the extent they depend on the 
                                                                                                                           
 215 See id. 
 216 One possible difficulty with the no-future-prejudice interpretation is that “the remainder of 
such term” language might be seen as strangely affording no help to the successor President who 
already served more than two years on the date of ratification, as opposed to the ratification-term 
successor President who had not yet served two years. However, this obscure problem (assuming 
it even is a problem) could have been avoided by endorsing a common-sense text-driven structural 
protection for such a person in keeping with principles the Supreme Court has recognized in the 
past. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 733–34 (1999) (relying largely on Eleventh 
Amendment’s textual protection of state sovereign immunity in federal court in concluding that a 
parallel non-textual principle of state sovereign immunity should apply no less in states’ own 
courts). The legislative history of the Twenty-Second Amendment also may create a problem for 
the no-future-prejudice interpretation because Congress’s focus, in crafting the transition clause, 
was on persons who would have served as President prior to the term of ratification, as was the 
case with President Truman. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing Taft-Tydings 
proposal). But one might say in response that Senator Taft reshuffled the entire transition clause 
deck when he supplemented the preexisting “prevent” clause with a new, separate, and unlimited 
grandfathering clause that dealt solely with President Truman as part of the eleventh-hour effort to 
forge a workable cross-party compromise. See supra notes 87–100 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Taft-Tydings proposal). All things considered, perhaps the best that can be said about the 
“shall not prevent” language is that it was meant in essence to ensure fair treatment to persons 
who happened to hold the presidential office during the transition period. And if that is true, it 
would be no stretch to conclude that one form of fair treatment involved not disadvantaging a 
Vice-President-turned-President with regard to future runs for the presidency based on ratifica-
tion-term service that followed an election occurring before the day on which the Twenty-Second 
Amendment took effect. 
2015] Two-Time Presidents and the Vice Presidency 1335 
transition clause, try to make far too much out of far too little.217 In other 
words, all four of those interpretations—namely, the total-ineligibility, the 
electoral-ineligibility, the no-succession-right, and the two-years-only-
succession-right approaches—try to extrapolate significant post-transition-
period substantive limits from a clause that was meant to focus simply on 
the transition period itself. We have seen that each of these extrapolations 
clashes directly with the texts of the operative Amendments. In striking con-
trast, the clarity-for-all-past-Presidents interpretation creates no such textual 
tensions at all. And, in particular, it accords independent meaning to that 
clause’s treatment of an “acting . . . President,” even if the operative provi-
sions of the Twelfth and Twenty-Second Amendments impose no limits 
whatsoever on would-be Vice-Presidents. 
To see why, one must begin by recognizing that the substantive limits 
on presidential service imposed by the Twenty-Second Amendment were 
inextricably tied to time, including potentially differing periods of time over 
which past or present presidential service might occur. In turn, this feature 
of the Amendment created a complicated set of retroactivity problems for 
its framers to consider. This Article already has touched on some of those 
complexities. What was Congress to do, for example, with President Harry 
Truman, who was already well into a period of extended presidential service 
when the Amendment came under consideration? And what about Presi-
dents other than Truman? Might the transition rules, for example, pay atten-
tion to—among other things—the difference between elected Presidents and 
non-elected Presidents during the ratification term, prior to the ratification 
term, or both? What about even the simplest case of a person who had 
served two elected terms as President prior to the four-year period during 
which ratification occurred? Should the new Amendment be deemed entire-
ly inapplicable to such a person? Should it apply only ex post in the sense 
that no effect would be given to the two pre-ratification terms, but that later 
terms would count toward the operative two-term limit? Might Congress 
split the difference by deciding that one of those pre-ratification-period 
terms, but not both, should count for Twenty-Second Amendment purposes? 
Should Congress forge different rules depending on whether the earlier term 
was a fully-served electoral term or only a partially- or fully-served succes-
sor term? 
The critical point is that, in crafting the transition clause of the Twen-
ty-Second Amendment, Congress could have incorporated into it a rich 
                                                                                                                           
 217 See supra notes 31–150 and accompanying text (Part I), 151–176 and accompanying text 
(Part II), 177–209 and accompanying text (Part III). See generally King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 
2480, 2495 (2015) (“We have held that Congress ‘does not alter the fundamental details of a regu-
latory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions.’” (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking 
Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001))). 
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blend of retroactivity-related rules. No less important, whatever retroactivi-
ty-related rules Congress did put in place were going to do two separate 
things at the same time: First, they would set forth some amount of non-
retroactivity protection for persons who might otherwise come within the 
reach of the Amendment’s substantive restrictions. Second, they also would 
establish the outer limit of non-retroactivity protections that such persons 
would receive. 
With these points in view, it becomes easier to see that the second part 
of the transition clause, including its reference to any “acting . . . President,” 
did useful work in establishing the rules with respect to (and only with re-
spect to) the transition period itself. To begin with, the transition clause 
drew a distinction between the Amendment’s treatment of President Truman 
and every other pre-ratification President.218 Thus, the first part of the tran-
sition clause gave President Truman a lifetime Twenty-Second-Amendment 
pass. The second part of the clause, in contrast, declared that all other per-
sons—whoever they might be—would receive a far less robust form of non-
retroactivity protection. Of no small importance, the second part of the tran-
sition clause also established that all of these other persons—whether they 
previously had served one, two, or even three or four terms as President, or 
served part terms or full terms, or served by way of election or succession—
would be treated the same way. No crazy quilt of retroactivity rules would 
be incorporated into the Amendment’s text, and no court would have to 
struggle with any of the many anti-retroactivity problems that any particular 
former President might bring before it. Rather, all former Presidents other 
than President Truman would receive protection from being defrocked dur-
ing the ratification term. And that was the only protection they would re-
ceive. 
Assume, for example, that someone other than President Truman—say, 
Adlai Stevenson—had been elected President in 1948 and then again in 
1952. Assume further that the Twenty-Second Amendment was not ratified 
until 1958; that in 1956 Stevenson had been elected Vice-President; and that 
he had become acting President in late 1957 due to the incapacitation of the 
President. Now make one final assumption—that the drafters of the Twenty-
Second Amendment had failed to deal with the case of an “acting . . . Presi-
dent” in the transition clause.219 One resulting problem leaps into view. 
Without such a treatment, a court might reason that the drafters of the 
Amendment meant to distinguish between elected Presidents and successor 
Presidents in such a way that only elected Presidents could serve “the re-
                                                                                                                           
 218 See 93 CONG. REC. 1940 (statement of Sen. Taft) (“I merely wish to invite the attention of 
the Senator to the difference between President Truman and any man who would occupy his office 
in the future.”). 
 219 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1. 
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mainder” of the ratification term. In other words, the reference to the “act-
ing . . . President” in the transition clause removed the possibility that a 
court might apply the transition clause—in a plausible, but congressionally 
unintended, way—to block our hypothesized version of Stevenson from 
serving out the full 1957–61 term. And for this reason, the transition 
clause’s treatment of an “acting . . . President” is not mere surplusage under 
the clarity-for-all-past-Presidents interpretation. 
Also consider another hypothetical case—one in which Stevenson, in 
addition to rendering eight years of presidential service from 1949 to 1957, 
also served the 1957–61 term as acting President. Assume also, again, that 
there was no treatment of an “acting . . . President” in the Twenty-Second 
Amendment’s transition clause. Finally, assume that this case includes a 
new wrinkle—namely, that Stevenson wants to run for President again in 
1960. Can he? With no treatment in the transition clause of an “acting . . . 
President,” we would not know the answer. Invoking the “presumption 
against retroactivity,”220 some courts might say that such a candidate should 
have a shot at a third electoral term as President, at least where (as this hy-
pothetical case posits) most of the officeholder’s presidential service pre-
dated ratification and no transition clause specifically barred that outcome. 
With the actual transition clause on the books, however, this result would be 
foreclosed. This is the case because the text of that clause provided a clear 
marker of the boundary of non-retroactivity protection given to someone in 
the circumstances confronted by the thus-hypothesized President Stevenson. 
He could serve out “the remainder” of the term of ratification—in this case, 
the 1957–61 term. But that was the full measure of the non-retroactivity 
protection he would receive, so that he could not secure election as Presi-
dent for another term in 1960. Again, the key point is that the treatment of an 
“acting . . . President” in the second part of the transition clause does not con-
stitute mere surplusage if one embraces the clarity-for-all-past-Presidents in-
terpretation. This is so because the “acting . . . President” language estab-
lished not only that any President other than Harry Truman (whether that 
President took office by election or succession) would receive “remainder of 
the term” non-retroactivity protection during the four-year period of ratifica-
tion, but also that any such President also would receive nothing more. 
The broader point is that all of the words of the second part of the tran-
sition clause had much work to do even if the Twenty-Second Amendment 
did not disqualify otherwise eligible candidates from running for the vice-
presidency, limit vice-presidential succession rights, or impose a generally 
applicable two-year limit on the period of post-succession service. The 
function of those words was to specify, in a comprehensive and unitary 
                                                                                                                           
 220 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW 261 (2012). 
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fashion, the full extent of operative retroactivity-related rules that would 
apply to any person other than Harry Truman who might end up serving or 
acting as President during the single presidential term during which the 
Twenty-Second Amendment was ratified.221 
The clarity-for-all-past-Presidents interpretation comports with the 
simple, common-sense notion that the subject matter of the transition clause 
most logically should be the period of transition itself. It also finds support 
in the legislative history of the transition clause in two respects. First, that 
history reveals that the clause in fact was designed to focus on ratification-
term-specific difficulties presented by past Presidents, beginning with Pres-
ident Truman.222 Second, that history shows that the clause’s reference to an 
                                                                                                                           
 221 One might challenge the clarity-for-all-past-Presidents interpretation on the ground that 
Congress could not have intended to embrace such a rule because it would have oddly affected 
only one person—namely, Herbert Hoover. As we have seen, this is the case because Section 2 of 
the Twenty-Second Amendment required that ratification occur within seven years of approval by 
Congress. U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 2; see supra note 150. On the better view, however, any 
argument along these lines for rejecting the clarity-for-all-past-Presidents view is misplaced. In-
deed, many separate reasons converge to support this conclusion. First, while the legislative record 
includes a few references to the seven-year period, there is no indication that Congress ever re-
flected on its interaction with other provisions of the Amendment. Second, the Herbert-Hoover-
will-be-the-only-person-affected peculiarity arose only because of an eleventh-hour, previously 
unexpected change to the transition clause that singled out President Truman for lifetime protec-
tion. (In other words, prior to this late-stage change, President Truman was the main target of the 
“remainder of such term” protection—not just President Hoover.) Third, Congress may well have 
drafted Section 1 of the Twenty-Second Amendment without paying heed to the seven-year ratifi-
cation period, in light of the possibility that the Amendment, in its final drafted form, might be 
endorsed by Congress only in some later congressional session, perhaps well down the road; in 
that case, the transition clause could well have affected persons in addition to President Hoover. 
Fourth, Congress could have later sought to extend the seven-year ratification period (as later 
Congresses did with regard to the proposed Equal Rights Amendment, see H.R.J. Res. 638, 95th 
Cong. (1977)), thus expanding the coverage of the transition clause to a set of persons that ranged 
well beyond President Hoover. Finally, even if this Herbert-Hoover-only argument does cut 
against the clarity-for-all-past-Presidents interpretation, it also cuts against the negative-
implication-based total-ineligibility, electoral-ineligibility, no-succession-right, and two-years-
only-succession right interpretations. In the end, the only extrapolation from the transition clause 
that avoids this complication is the no-future-prejudice interpretation because only that interpreta-
tion provides protection to the Vice-President who becomes President during the ratification term 
without any reference to Herbert-Hoover-like past presidential service. 
 222 In particular, the transition clause, in its initial form, afforded all potential officeholders 
“remainder of such term” non-retroactivity protection in a unitary, across-the-board way. The 
essential purpose of this draft clause, however, was to deal with President Truman because every-
one knew that he had already served a major portion of the 1945–49 term and that he might well 
seek the presidency one or more times in the near future, including during what would turn out to 
be the term of ratification. It was only at the last stage of the drafting process that President Tru-
man was afforded stand-alone lifetime protection by the first part of the transition clause. Con-
gress nonetheless retained the original transition clause language as the clause’s second part, ap-
parently on the theory that someone other than President Truman could somehow end up within 
the Amendment’s reach during the ratification term. The relevant point is that because the purpose 
of the transition clause was very narrow, it is an ambitious project to extract from it substantial 
ongoing substantive limitations on the freedoms of both candidates and voters. To be sure, the 
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“acting . . . President” made particularly good sense—in keeping with the 
clarity-for-all-past-Presidents interpretation—in light of how earlier ver-
sions of the Amendment’s substantive terms had dealt with Presidents who 
came into office by way of succession, rather than election.223 In short, the 
transition clause—based on its text, its subject matter, and its history—best 
supports (by a wide measure) the clarity-for-all-past-Presidents interpreta-
tion. And that interpretation does not comport with, far less command, the 
recognition of otherwise nonexistent substantive rules that would impose 
significant limits on would-be Vice-Presidents in perpetuity. For this reason, 
the transition clause—when accorded its proper meaning—supports the 
conclusion that, going into the future, a twice-before-elected President can 
be elected Vice-President and then can succeed to the presidency from that 
office for the full duration of the unexpired term.224 
                                                                                                                           
transition clause anticipated the possibility that a Vice-President-turned-President, who had twice 
before been elected President, might be serving as President during the term of ratification—just 
as was the case with our hypothesized version of President Stevenson. The clause also anticipated 
that someone might make the argument—however unfair and overreaching it might be—that such 
a person could not continue to hold the presidential office during the still-unfolding four-year 
term, in light of the Amendment’s recent ratification. The core purpose of the transition clause 
was to take the sting out of these arguments, exactly as the clarity-for-all-past-Presidents interpre-
tation does. 
 223 The key point here is that, prior to emergence of the Taft-Tydings compromise, the pro-
posed text of the Twenty-Second Amendment’s substantive restraint provided as follows: “A 
person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, on 365 calendar days or more in 
each of two terms shall not be eligible to hold the office of President or to act as President for any 
part of another term.” See supra note 61 and accompanying text (emphasis added) (discussing 
Senate Judiciary Committee proposal). The “remainder of such term” transition clause was origi-
nally tethered to this substantive restraint. Moreover, with regard to this substantive restraint, the 
transition clause made obvious sense because it allowed an acting President to serve out “the re-
mainder” of the ratification term even though such a person would “not be eligible . . . to act as 
President” during that term in the absence of some form of anti-retroactivity protection. Notably, 
the text of the transition clause—in this, its originally intended, context of use—carried with it no 
negative implication whatsoever; rather, it simply created an exemption with regard to the ratifica-
tion term from the explicitly stated substantive restraint on service embodied in the proposed 
Amendment. When the Taft-Tydings proposal later came forward, this same “remainder of such 
term” language was simply carried over to it. Moreover, this carry-over occurred with no indica-
tion of any kind that the transition clause was somehow being re-conceptualized so as to cause it 
to assume a new and critical role in generating an otherwise nonexistent, text-straining, voter-
restricting, for-all-time negative implication with regard to the Amendment’s operative substan-
tive reach. Especially against this backdrop, there is every reason to endorse the clarity-for-all-
past-Presidents interpretation. This is so because that interpretation ascribes to the transition 
clause exactly the same form of ratification-term-specific, non-retroactivity protection that that 
same clause had provided prior to the legislative tinkering that produced the final Taft-Tydings 
revision. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492 (declining to give rigid, program-altering reading to a dis-
crete portion of the statutory text when there are signals that it “does not reflect the type of care 
and deliberation that one might expect”).  
 224 See United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inward Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 
(1988) (noting that “[a] provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the 
remainder of the statutory scheme . . . because only one of the permissible meanings produces a 
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V. IN CONCLUSION: BRINGING IT ALL BACK HOME 
On Maggie’s Farm, the third track of Bob Dylan’s 1965 album Bring-
ing It All Back Home, he wails: “I got a head full of ideas that are drivin’ me 
insane . . . .”225 The preceding discussion raises its own risk of producing 
information overload. So how does the weaver of the legal tapestry bring 
together the many strands of analysis, some central and some subsidiary, set 
                                                                                                                           
substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law” (citations omitted)); Lynch v. Al-
worth-Stephens Co., 267 U.S. 364, 370 (1925) (observing that “the plain, obvious and rational 
meaning of a statute is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow, hidden sense that nothing 
but the . . . ingenuity and study of an acute and powerful intellect would discover” (citation omit-
ted)). As the forgoing discussion shows, the clarity-for-all-past-Presidents interpretation does not 
render the reference to an “acting . . . President” in the transition clause mere surplusage. But what 
if one somehow concluded that it did? On the better view, that interpretation would still be the 
right one. Indeed, at least five reasons support this conclusion. First, in context, the reference to 
acting Presidents in the transition clause very naturally carried forward to that clause identical 
language that already appeared in the operative-rule-creating, immediately-preceding sentence of 
the Twenty-Second Amendment. (In particular, the Amendment’s operative clause rendered it 
applicable to a “person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than 
two years.” It thus was entirely natural and sensible to deploy a parallel construction in the transi-
tion clause.) Second, the reference to the acting President helped to communicate the comprehen-
sive coverage meant to be provided by the second portion of the transition clause—that is, cover-
age of every potential ratification-term President except Harry Truman. Third, the interpretive 
canon based on mere surplusage must be applied in any event with attentiveness to other canons, 
including canons based on textual clarity that may (and, in this case, very strongly do) exert coun-
terforces. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492 (noting that “our preference for avoiding surplusage is not 
absolute” (quoting Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 536 (2004)); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 
220, at 59, 176 (noting that “[n]o canon of interpretation is absolute” and that “[e]ach may be 
overcome by the strength of differing principles that point in other directions”; adding, with regard 
to the anti-surplusage canon, that: “So like all other canons, it must be applied with judgment and 
discretion, and with careful regard to context. It cannot be always dispositive . . . .”). Fourth, the 
anti-surplusage canon does not operate, in any event, when the relevant text is rightly viewed as 
serving to remove any doubt about how the Constitution operates in a particular context. See, e.g., 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) (noting that the Necessary and Prop-
er Clause was included in the Constitution simply to “remove all doubts” about the existence of 
implied legislative powers). Finally, in crafting the Twenty-Second Amendment, there was espe-
cially good reason to remove any doubt about the delegitimizing of any person handling the presi-
dential office—including any successor or acting President—during the one-time, distinctly vola-
tile presidential term in which the Twenty-Second Amendment would initially take effect. In par-
ticular, this clarification (even if it were only a clarification) held the promise of sparing both the 
then-sitting or then-acting President and the nation as a whole from the risk of severe disruption 
by preempting any effort by such a person’s political opponents to demand an immediate ouster 
from office on the date of ratification. Notably, the existence of any such demands—regardless of 
their lack of legal merit—would inevitably involve distraction, partisan rancor, and unfairness 
both to the actual or acting President and to those members of the electorate who had supported 
the ticket that included that person prior to ratification. With these dangers in view, it would have 
been, and was, entirely sensible for the drafters of the transition clause simply to sweep all such 
arguments off the table for purposes of the set-of-one four-year term during which ratification 
occurred. 
 225 BOB DYLAN, Maggie’s Farm, on BRINGING IT ALL BACK HOME (Columbia Records 
1965). 
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forth in the preceding pages? To recognize the complexity of the task is im-
portant in and of itself. The vast majority of analyses of whether a twice-
elected President can take on the vice-presidency have cropped up in news-
paper commentaries, television interviews, blog posts, and the like. There is 
nothing wrong with analyses of this kind. As this Article shows, however, 
the questions raised by the Twelfth and Twenty-Second Amendments do not 
lend themselves to quick and easy answers. 
This point should cause us to shift attention to another fact of legal 
life. Those who labor in the field of constitutional interpretation inevitably 
bring to their efforts differing values, differing styles of analysis, and differ-
ing points of emphasis. In working through the questions considered here, 
some analysts will focus on the text of the Twelfth and Twenty-Second 
Amendments; others will pay more attention to their underlying purposes. 
Some observers will attend to how the Twenty-Second Amendment came to 
be; others will ignore that history altogether. Some interpreters will bring to 
the task a preference for broad and clear directives; others will be willing to 
accept a greater measure of nuance and contextualism. Some analysts will 
brush aside efforts to rely on the “spirit of the Constitution”; others will not 
hesitate to seek guidance in the organizing themes of our founding charter. 
And there will be great differences of opinion, too, about what those organ-
izing themes might be. In this setting, for example, some analysts will em-
phasize the longstanding republicanism-centered norm of maximizing free 
voter choice. But others will say that the crafters of the Twenty-Second 
Amendment sought to forestall the emergence of autocracy, thus establish-
ing a pro-republican counter-theme of properly limiting voter freedom in 
nationwide elections. Many interpreters will insist that the meaning of the 
Twelfth and Twenty-Second Amendments must operate today in exactly the 
same way it operated in 1951; others might pay heed to shifting background 
conditions, emphasizing such matters as the ever-growing powers of the 
modern presidency, the lengthening of human lifespans, or the proliferation 
of ever-more-vexing international crises. 
In the face of these complexities, some observers will take the view 
that a decisive cutting of the Gordian Knot is needed, so as to bring at least 
the benefit of legal certainty to this welter of confusion. Adopting this view, 
however, does not move the ball forward because there exist two polar-
opposite ambiguity-defeating resolutions of the interpretive muddle. Ac-
cording to one resolution, a twice-before-elected President cannot become 
Vice-President and therefore cannot succeed from that office to the presi-
dency if a vacancy occurs. According to the other resolution, a twice-
before-elected President can run for Vice-President, can succeed from that 
office to the presidency if a vacancy arises, and then can serve out the full 
remainder of the still-unfolding term. Because each of these resolutions 
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provides a clear and comprehensive solution, a commitment to the cause of 
certainty does not help resolve the key questions at hand. Some other way 
to “bring it all back home” must be found. So how should the story end? 
It is important at the outset to recognize that the analysis set forth in 
this Article—despite its twists and turns—does not leave the law rudderless 
on a sea of doubt. Take, for example, Judge Posner’s argument that the 
Twenty-Second Amendment, of its own force, bars the election of a twice-
before-elected President to the vice-presidency. On close inspection, this 
contention faces so many difficulties that it should be moved off the table. 
The thrust of Judge Posner’s contention is that the Vice-President is “elect-
ed to the office of the President”—albeit conditionally—within the meaning 
of the Twenty-Second Amendment. But other portions of the Twenty-
Second Amendment itself directly undermine this interpretive position, 
even if one can somehow dodge the separate problem that ordinary speakers 
would seldom describe being elected to the office of Vice-President as the 
same thing as being “elected to the office of the President.” It follows that, 
if a twice-before-elected President cannot run for Vice-President, it must be 
because of the joint operation of the Twelfth and Twenty-Second Amend-
ments. 
As to this matter, thoughtful observers have expressed different views. 
Indeed, first-rate legal thinkers have concluded that the class of persons 
who are “ineligible for the office of the President” under the Twelfth 
Amendment includes those persons who cannot “be elected” to that office 
under the Twenty-Second. But the treatments of the issue offered by these 
commentators tend to be preliminary in nature or abbreviated in scope, 
whereas the comprehensive treatment offered in the preceding pages shows 
at least that these analysts have failed to grapple with key arguments against 
their position. Most important, if the drafters of the Twenty-Second 
Amendment had meant to establish a rule about eligibility, they could have, 
should have, and would have used the language of eligibility. Indeed, the 
logic of this contention is especially strong because the word “eligible” (1) 
is the operative term of the Twelfth Amendment, (2) was used in Article II, 
Section 1 to capture the very set of exclusions meant to be covered by the 
Twelfth Amendment rule, and (3) appeared repeatedly in drafts of the Twen-
ty-Second Amendment before Congress, with good reason, specifically 
chose to abandon its use. In these circumstances, basic principles of inter-
pretation point with clarity to a simple conclusion: Congress’s decision not 
to use the language of eligibility in the Twenty-Second Amendment indi-
cates that it meant not to establish an eligibility rule. 
Nor is this problem somehow skirted by reformulating the no-
eligibility approach to focus on ineligibility only for election, as opposed to 
ineligibility for appointment. As we have seen, there are many problems 
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with this approach. Most fundamentally, it is at odds with the Twelfth 
Amendment’s unitary textual focus on “eligibility for the office of the Pres-
ident”—a phrasing that offers not the faintest hint of recognizing a distinc-
tion between alternative modes of assuming the presidential or the vice-
presidential office. 
This brings us to the transition clause. Professor Amar has rendered val-
uable service in highlighting the relevance of the clause to the matters consid-
ered here. But any effort to build an argument for ineligibility based on this 
obscure provision travels several bridges too far. Put simply, the many argu-
ments for permitting two-time Presidents to become Vice-President—based 
on textual non-parallelism, late-stage substitution of new terminology, the 
contextual relevance of Senator Magnuson’s substitute amendment, and the 
underlying constitutional theme of free voter choice—render untenable any 
effort to exploit the “housekeeping” transition clause to salvage the otherwise 
unsalvageable eligibility-limiting interpretation of the governing Amend-
ments’ substantive terms. And that is all the more the case because other, 
more reasonable extrapolations from the transition clause are at hand. 
So which of the non-eligibility-related extrapolations makes the most 
sense—the no-succession-right interpretation, the two-years-only-successor-
right interpretation, the no-future-prejudice interpretation, or the clarity-for-
all-past-Presidents interpretation? The last of these choices is the best by a 
wide margin. 
Embracing the no-succession interpretation requires an assumption 
that the drafters of the Twenty-Second Amendment somehow meant to set 
forth a functionally problematic restriction that was wholly untethered to 
the Amendment’s substantive terms. And although the two-years-only-
succession-right interpretation may be the most plausible of these interpre-
tations that place an ongoing, substantive limit on vice-presidential service, 
it creates serious problems of its own. In particular, this interpretation re-
flects a highly ambitious, non-past-tense reading of the statutory text that 
would compel destabilizing mid-term shifts in the presidency under some 
circumstances. 
The no-future-prejudice interpretation is more plausible than either the 
no-succession-right interpretation or two-years-only-succession-right ap-
proach to the Twenty-Second Amendment. But the clarity-for-all-past-
Presidents interpretation best fits with the text and structure of the transition 
clause itself. That approach, after all, focuses the operation of the transition 
clause on the transition period itself, while attributing to the drafters a sen-
sible plan to deal with the distinctly complex set of transition problems pre-
sented by the operative terms of the Twenty-Second Amendment. Most im-
portantly, the clarity-for-all-past-Presidents approach accords significance 
to all the words of the transition clause, while ascribing a meaning to it that 
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is simultaneously responsive to the text, structure, purpose, and history of 
all the operative constitutional provisions.  
Bringing It All Back Home includes another track—Dylan’s famous 
Subterranean Homesick Blues—in which he famously observes: “You don’t 
need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows.”226 Perhaps Dyl-
an’s point applies here. Some observers are sure to declare that no party 
convention would ever choose a former two-term President to run for the 
vice-presidency. Indeed, they might note that the very swirl of legal com-
plexities revealed by this Article confirms the soundness of this prognosti-
cation. But if history teaches us any lesson at all, it is to never say never. It 
may be that no prior-two-term President will seek the vice-presidency in 
our next presidential election. But someday, one likely will. And when that 
happens, the analysis offered in this Article indicates three things: (1) Amer-
ica’s voters can legally place that person in the vice-presidency; (2) that 
person can later succeed from that office to the presidency; and (3) if such a 
succession occurs, no cap on the duration of resulting presidential service 
will inhibit that person from serving out the full remainder of the term. 
                                                                                                                           
 226 BOB DYLAN, Subterranean Homesick Blues, on BRINGING IT ALL BACK HOME, supra 
note 225. 
